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Abstract
This dissertation examines how firms manage the unfavorable impact of information
asymmetry - be it not knowing payoff relevant characteristics of the employee or the
inability to observe the actions taken by the employee. While firms develop a multi-
tude of mechanisms to mitigate their impact, they aren’t always able to completely
eliminate them. The first essay studies the advantages and disadvantages of frequent
performance reviews over intermittent performance reviews in situations where firms
are unable to observe payoff relevant characteristics. Performance reviews are one of
the tools used by firms to weed out ill-matched employees. How often they should
be held has been the subject of a lot of debate recently. The key trade-off is the
timing of information arrival and the amount of information. In frequent reviews
managers learn about the employees sooner, but in intermittent reviews they have
more information to go by. Each review regime performs better under different con-
ditions. Thus, a priori frequent reviews do not always achieve better results than
intermittent reviews. The second essay studies the problem of motivating effort when
the employee has to plan and execute the project in the presence of limited liability.
The employer is unable to observe the effort involved in information acquisition and
the information itself giving rise to moral hazard. It is shown that limited liability
induces a risk neutral agent to take excessive/insufficient risk for different parameter
values. Thus, limited liability constraints not only raise the cost of contracting, they
also change the level of risk taking. The third essay extends the model in the second
essay to two periods. It is shown that the time of contracting affects the feasibility
of the first-best solution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the ubiquitous features of the employee-employer relationship is information
asymmetry. Firms delegate tasks to employees. Sometimes they are unaware of payoff
relevant characteristics of the employee and sometimes they are unable to monitor or
observe the actions taken by the employee. Often, it is a combination of the two. Over
time, most organizations develop mechanisms to mitigate the unfavorable impact of
the information asymmetry on output and profit. However, these mechanisms are
constantly evolving, as is our understanding of them.
Economists have long studied these phenomena and the mechanisms used by firms
to mitigate them. The vast literature on adverse selection and moral hazard is a testa-
ment to the range and scope of the issues firms and employees face. This dissertation
seeks to add to that body of knowledge by addressing two issues faced by managers
under information asymmetry. The first, studied in chapter 2, pertains to a recent
debate in the personnel management literature regarding the impact of the frequency
of performance reviews. The second, addressed in chapter 3, studies the optimal
contract when the employee is required to perform the twin tasks of information
acquisition and project selection.
Firms can rarely claim that they know all the payoff relevant characteristics of
their employees. Performance reviews are the most common tool used by firms in
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personnel management. These reviews are meant to separate the high performers
from the low performers and hence refine the employee pool. In 2012, Adobe, the
American software company employing 13,500 employees worldwide, announced that
it would no longer conduct annual performance reviews. Instead, the firm instituted
the system of monthly “check ins”. While monthly check ins have some features
that are different from annual performance reviews, the important difference is the
frequency of the review. More frequent reviews are meant to reveal more information
to the employer in a timely manner and hence enhance the efficiency of the workforce.
However, a key trade-off that is missing from this argument is the reduction in the
amount of information that stems from more frequent reviewing. The fewer the
number of decisions on which the review is based, the less information the employer
has to help him decide whether or not to retain the employee. Chapter 2 seeks to
illustrate this point.
I set up a simple model where a firm is faced with a pool of employees, some
of whom are ill-matched with their jobs, but the firm is unable to distinguish them
from the good matches. As they work with the firm, their decisions provide imper-
fect information about their fit or their underlying characteristics. The purpose of
performance reviews is to use this information to draw inferences about the unknown
characteristics of the employee and weed out the ill-matched ones. I compare two
performance review regimes - intermittent and frequent. The two regimes are distin-
guished by how many times the employee makes decisions on behalf of the firm before
the firm conducts a performance review. When employees make more decisions, more
information is known to the firm at the time of review. On the other hand, the longer
an ill-matched employee works for the firm the higher the losses to the firm from bad
decisions. I compare the efficacy of intermittent and frequent reviews.
I find that intermittent reviews only support two kinds of equilibria - equilibria
where each type of employee picks their preferred action and the firm knows exactly
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which type it is facing and equilibria where the employees pick the same actions
irrespective of type and the firm learns nothing. Frequent reviews support additional
equilibria wherein the ill-matched employees mimic good employees for some decisions
and not for others. The firm learns a little about the type of the employee, but not
enough to distinguish the two types perfectly. This is the first weakness of frequent
reviews. The second kind of weakness that reviews might have is where employees
take the same action irrespective of type and the firm learns nothing. This occurs
in both review regimes. In this case, performance reviews fail to achieve their goal.
When this situation arises, it turns out that nature of the task determines which
review regime is more effective. If the desirable action is more informative, then
intermittent reviews are more likely to succeed in weeding out bad matches. If the
undesirable action is more informative, then the opposite is true. In sum, I argue
that frequent reviews are by no means prima facie superior to intermittent reviews.
In fact, under certain conditions intermittent reviews may fare better. If we add to
that the fact that more frequent reviews usually cost more, it becomes less obvious
that firms want to adopt them indiscriminately.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation looks at a different problem faced by firms. Infor-
mation acquisition and project selection are two tasks that are often delegated to the
same employee. For example, whenever the employee needs expertise for executing
projects and acquiring expertise is costly, it is often the same employee who is respon-
sible for acquiring expertise and executing the project. Previous work suggests that
in this environment moral hazard assumes a unique dimension. The firm wishes to
delegate two interrelated tasks, rather than one - learning new information and using
the information correctly. The first task is costly to the executive and the second task
is not. Earlier papers have shown that this problem suffers from twin moral hazard
- in the costly as well as the costless task. The latter is surprising and creates an
interesting set of issues, which I attempt to address with this work. Motivating the
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first-best outcome may not always be possible. However, most of the work on this
problem so far assumes that the principal and agent have different attitudes to risk.
It is, however, unclear whether this result is driven by the risk aversion of the agent or
because the principal needs to motivate the agent to perform two interrelated tasks.
I address this issue by showing that it is possible implement the first-best outcome if
the principal and agent are both risk neutral.
The focus of the chapter, however, is on the impact of having a limited liability
constraint for the agent. In most situations in which the agent assumes decision
making responsibilities on behalf of the principal, the agent has limited liability. I
study the above problem in the presence of limited liability (and risk neutrality of
principal and agent) and find that there may not exist a contract that achieves first
best. In fact, the agent often takes excessive/insufficient risk. With this result, I add
to a body of literature that argues that limited liability constraints not only make
contracting expensive, they alter risk taking incentives. My analysis is novel because
I observe that risk taking may increase or decrease under the optimal contract. This
is a departure from earlier work that shows that limited liability constraints increase
risk taking. I then argue that for some parameter values the optimal contract is
concave. It induces the agent to behave as if he were risk averse and take insufficient
risk. For other parameter values the optimal contract is convex and induces the agent
to behave as if he were risk loving and take excessive risk. The trade-off is between
motivating information acquisition and use and reducing costs in the presence of
limited liability which tends to raise contract costs for the principal.
These results suggest that excessive/insufficient risk-taking is even more likely
than was previously shown to be true by the information acquisition and use lit-
erature. Lambert (1986) shows that when the agent is risk averse and there is no
limited liability, the optimal contract leads to excessive/insufficient risk taking. I
show that when the agent is risk neutral and there is limited liability there is exces-
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sive/insufficient risk taking. This seems to indicate that excessive/insufficient is not
an archetype of the difference in risk attitude, but a highly likely outcome in this
environment.
Most employee-employer relationships involve repeated interactions over time. In
some situations this can make it easier to implement the full information outcome.
However, there are many ways in which this repeated interaction can be organized.
In chapter 4, I study the problem of implementing the first-best outcome when the
task described in chapter 3 is delegated to the agent for two periods rather than one.
I compare three contracting regimes - period by period contracting, date-0 contract-
ing with no recontracting and date-0 contracting with recontracting. I restrict my
attention to the conditions under which the first best can be implemented. Allowing
the agent to recontract means allowing him to access his outside option at date-1.
The key take away from this chapter is that certain contracting regimes raise the
expected payoff to the agent without the actual outside options being higher. This
raises the upper bound for the set of parameters under which the first best can be
implemented. The choice of contracting regime depends on the trade off between the
minimum expected payoff under the participation constraint and the loss of payoff
induced by not using a linear contract.
Chapter 2
Impact of timing of performance
reviews
2.1 Introduction and motivation
Performance reviews are the most widespread tool used by organizations for per-
formance management. Most private firms as well as government agencies hold an
annual employee review. For that matter, elections can be thought of as a review
of the performance of an elected representative at the end of a designated term. In
2012, Adobe announced that it was replacing its annual performance review system
with ”frequent check-ins”. The reason for this policy change was to give managers a
chance to monitor employee performance in a timely manner rather than annually.
Whether this system is more effective than the previous one remains to be seen, but
it does raise some important and interesting questions about the how the frequency
of reviews might matter, especially in environments where the actions of employees
are not perfectly observed. The quality of information available to managers would
be significantly different under different review regimes. Further, the nature of the
job and the industry within which the firm operates may affect the efficacy of these
reviews. In this chapter, I attempt to shed light on some of these issues.
Consider the problem of an agent working for a firm. His job is to make decisions
6
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on behalf of the principal over time. At the end of a designated term (usually a
year1) his performance is reviewed. The outcome of this review is often linked to the
agent’s incentives to perform on the job. These incentives can be explicit - in the
form of wages and remuneration, or implicit - in the form of future prospects in the
firm or outside options. In this chapter, I focus on implicit incentives, in particular
the agent’s outside options if he leaves the firm,. If, for instance, the agent’s preferred
actions2 do not align with the principal’s preferred action, can the firm always identify
and eliminate the ill-matched agent during the review given that different types of
agents may have different outside options? Further, does intermittent review, rather
than frequent review, align the incentives of the principal and agent more effectively?
I find that the answer to these questions depends on the quality of information about
the actions chosen, and the relative importance to the agent of being kept on rather
than taking his preferred action in every period. Hence, it is not clear that one review
regime outperforms the other. The specifics of the environment matter a great deal.
I set up a model where (payoff relevant) information about the agent is hidden
from the principal. The agent chooses actions in multiple periods. His actions are not
observed, but they generate informative public signals. The principal observes the
signals and updates his beliefs about which kind of agent he is facing. Based on these
beliefs the principal either keeps or fires the agent and I call this a review. Thus,
review is a binary decision. Situations in which the reviews lead to discretionary pay
appraisals if the agent is retained are not addressed by this chapter. I study two
review regimes - intermittent and frequent. In intermittent review regimes review
happens once every two periods. In frequent review regimes review happens after
every period. I compare the efficacy of the two.
In order to make a meaningful comparison, I describe what I mean by failure of
1In a survey, the Society of Human Resource Management (SHRM) find that 72% of their sample
of firms has an annual performance review process in place.
2Equivalently, the action least costly to him
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the review. The primary objective of employee reviews is to weed out employees who
are not a good match for the firm in the sense that their preferences are not the same
as those of the firm. Thus, if one review regime fails to single out the ill-matched
candidate in a situation where the other one would, then the second regime can
reasonably be said to be superior for that situation. Equilibria in which both well-
matched and ill-matched employees choose the same actions every time it is their turn
to choose are referred to as pooling equilibria. I define these formally in section 3
and show that in a pooling equilibrium the firm doesn’t learn anything from publicly
observed signals of employee performance and is unable to distinguish between well-
matched and ill-matched employees. Thus, a pooling equilibrium is a failure of the
review process. In this chapter, if the equilibrium under one review regime is a pooling
equilibrium whereas it wouldn’t be under another regime, I conclude that the latter
regime is superior.
Pooling equilibria arise when outside options are low. The higher the outside
option, the less concerned the agent is about continuing his career in the firm. Further,
I find that whether intermittent or frequent reviews will serve the firm better depends
on the quality of the information known to the firm.
The second, more subtle, kind of failure arises when reviews are less dependable.
By less dependable I mean that the probability of weeding out the ill-matched em-
ployee is larger than in a pooling equilibrium, but smaller than an equilibrium where
each agent chooses his preferred action every time he is called upon to make a deci-
sion. I show that this kind of failure does not arise if the principal chooses to review
the agent intermittently. However, it is widespread if there are frequent reviews. The
reason for this is that the principal bases his decision in the review on signals gener-
ated by only one action rather than two. The ill-matched agent takes advantage of
this fact and mimics the good type just enough to be retained during the review.
No review regime is unconditionally better than the other in this model.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I review the literature in section 2.
Section 3 describes and analyzes two models - the model with intermittent review and
the model with frequent reviews. The latter half of the section compares the outcomes
under the two review regimes. Section 4 concludes and discusses the implications of
these results.
2.2 Relationship to literature
It has long been known that time matters a great deal in environments with hidden
information about the agent. Principals observe the performance of the agent over
time and this allows them to learn relevant information about the agent from his ac-
tions (Radner, 1981). Holmstrom (1999) argues that in dynamic contracting problems
time is important for another reason. When today’s performance is linked to future
payoffs, the agent has an incentive to manipulate what the principal learns about him
from his actions, sometimes even by sacrificing current payoffs. While learning about
the agent’s ability over time makes it easier to solve the incentive problems that arise
as a result of the hidden information, these future payoffs or “career concerns” can
make it easier or harder to achieve efficiency depending on how the preferences of the
agent align with those of the principal. These career concerns or implicit incentives
(elections or promotions) are particularly important in the government sector where
explicit incentives (wages) are often weak Dewatripont et al. (1999b).
There is significant empirical evidence that supports the theoretical literature on
the importance of career concerns. For instance, it has been shown that the perfor-
mance of CEOs is strongly correlated with the probability of serving on the board
of the firm after retirement (Brickley et al., 1999). Similarly, Gibbons and Murphy
(1992) argue that since agents care about future career concerns and these concerns
weaken over time as the agent’s retirement draws closer, explicit compensation can
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be low at the beginning of the career, but has to be high at the end of the agent’s
career. They find empirical support for this theory by studying CEO compensation
and stock performances.
In most firms there is a fixed time between subsequent performance reviews that
is known to the employee and the reviewer. Elections are also held (barring some
exceptions) after fixed periods. Knowing when one’s performance will be evaluated
may distort the incentives of the agent compared to a world where there was no fixed
time of review, thus potentially keeping the review from being effective. For instance,
Downs and Rocke (1994) argue that if the agent is choosing from risky options, then
a poorly performing agent might have the incentive to pick the riskier option close
to an upcoming review to make a last ditch attempt to save his job. They call this
“gambling for resurrection”. Thus, the presence of reviews raises several interesting
issues. It is in the principal’s interest to know how when and how often he should
review the agent.
One strand of research that directly addresses the distortions in decision making
that arise due to reviews in the context of democratically elected officials. Electoral
cycles in macroeconomic policy have been studied extensively. Some of the earliest
theoretical work (Nordhaus (1975); MacRae (1977) etc) posits that politicians will
exploit the trade-off offered by the Phillips curve before the elections to decrease
unemployment by increasing inflation. The assumptions and therefore conclusions
of these models were, however, called into question. Sophisticated voters would foil
any attempts by the incumbent to sub optimally inflate just before the election.
These models, often referred to as adaptive expectations models, were then replaced
by rational expectations models Rogoff (1990); Rogoff and Sibert (1988). Electoral
cycles in budgetary variables are generated by different mechanisms - most often
information asymmetry. For instance, in Rogoff (1990) electoral cycles are generated
by an equilibrium signaling process. Voters learn about the government’s competence
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by a one period lag and they care about competence while voting. Governments then
have a reason to exploit the information asymmetry and end up generating electoral
cycles in taxes.
There is a considerable body of literature examining the empirical evidence for
political business as well as budgetary cycles. The empirical evidence for political
business cycles is mixed, but the evidence on political budgetary cycles is rather
robust (see Alesina et al. (1989) for a detailed discussion of the evidence).
In this paper I study the efficacy of the review process for varying levels of outside
options in an environment with hidden information. I argue that low outside options
of employees can derail the review process irrespective of how frequently reviews are
held. In addition, frequent reviews allow ill-matched employees to escape detection
due to the fact that the principal’s decision is based on fewer signals. Under some
conditions intermittent reviewing outperforms frequent reviewing, while the reverse
may be true under different conditions.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Players, preferences and information
There are two players - an agent (a) and a principal (p). The agent makes decisions on
behalf of the principal. Every time the agent is called upon to act he chooses an action
from the set A = {X, Y }. The agent can be of two types - “type x” and “type y”,
with probability α and 1− α respectively where α ∈ (0, 1). Type x’s most preferred
action is X and his outside option, in case he no longer works for the principal, is τx.
Type y’s most preferred action is Y and his outside option is τy. Types are private
information.
Every time the principal moves he chooses an action from the set P = {k, f},
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where k stands for “keep” and f stands for “fire”. Thus, performance reviews are
simple; at the designated time the principal reviews whatever he knows of the agent’s
work and decide whether to keep him or fire him. If the agent is fired then nature
picks a “replacement” agent (RA) who is type x with probability α and type y with
probability 1− α.
The per period utility function of the type i agent, i ∈ {x, y}, is given by ui(c) ∈
R++, c ∈ A and the per period utility function of the principal is given by v(c) ∈ R++.
Type x prefers action X, so ux(X) > ux(Y ). Type y prefers Y so uy(Y ) > uy(X).
I assume that v(X) > v(Y ), that is, the principal prefers action X to Y . Utility is
additively separable over time. There is no discounting.
Pre-review actions are not observed, but every action generates a signal that is
publicly observed immediately before the review. The probability of observing a
signal depends on the action chosen and the period in which the action is chosen but
not on the type of the agent choosing the action. The signal space is S = {SX , SY }.
Let at ∈ A be the action chosen by the agent in period t and let st ∈ S be the signal
generated by at. Then
P (st = SX |at = X) = θtX and P (st = SY |at = Y ) = θtY
I assume throughout that
(i) For all m ∈ {X, Y } and n ∈ {1, 2}, 1
2
< θnm < 1
(ii) For every at ∈ A, st’s are independent.
Thus, SX and SY denote the signals observed with the highest probability if the
agent chooses actions X and Y respectively. Further, signals are informative and
independent.
2.3. Model 13
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of game with intermittent review
2.3.2 Timing of reviews - intermittent and frequent
Under intermittent review the timing of the game is as follows. Nature moves and
picks the type of the agent. The agent serves in office for 2 periods before the review
and picks an action from the set A in each period. The principal does not observe
the action chosen; instead all3 players observe a signal about the actions after both
the actions have been chosen. This feature of the model is meant to capture the fact
that the review is intermittent rather than in every period. Review takes place. The
principal either keeps (k) or fires (f) the agent based on the signal observed. If the
agent is retained, he picks two more actions, each from set A, everyone gets their
payoff and the game ends. If the agent is fired then the replacement agent joins the
firm. The replacement agent picks two actions and the game ends. The fired agent
gets his full utility from pre-review actions and his outside option τi in each post
review period. The timing is shown in Figure 2.1
In order to meaningfully study the impact of reviewing more often, I construct a
comparable game with frequent reviews. The sequence of events is as follows. Nature
moves and picks the type of the agent. Whenever the agent is called upon to move, he
3The other extreme of this assumption is that employees are aware of the signal their first period
action generates at the time that they make the second period decision. Arguably, in most settings
neither extreme holds. Instead, employees learn how they did in the first period but their perception
need not coincide with the firm’s perception of their performance. The assumption I make in this
chapter allows me to draw a starker comparison between frequent and intermittent reviews.
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Figure 2.2: Timeline of game with frequent review
chooses an action from the set A. The agent chooses an action. The principal never
observes the action chosen, instead all players observe an imperfect signal about the
action. Review takes place. The principal either keeps (k) or fires (f) the agent based
on the signal observed. If the agent is retained, he picks another action, followed by
a public signal regarding his second action and the second review. If the agent is
retained once again, he picks one final action and the game ends. If the agent is fired
at the first review, then nature picks a “replacement” agent who picks an action,
there is a public signal about his action, a review and if retained, he makes another
decision before the game ends. If the agent is fired following the second review then
the replacement agent makes only one decision. The fired agent gets his full utility
from pre-review actions and his outside option τi in each post review period. The
timing is shown in Figure 2.2.
2.3.3 Equilibria in model with intermittent reviews
In dynamic games with incomplete information, as the one studied here, it is possible
that some information sets are not reached with strictly positive probability. If some
information sets are not reached with strictly positive probability, Bayes’ rule is not
applicable at those information sets and it is not clear how the players will assign
beliefs to different nodes at these information sets and thus pick one strategy over
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another. Assumption (i) ensures that under intermittent review no matter which
strategy each type of the agent chooses, every information set is reached with strictly
positive probability. As a result, several well known equilibrium concepts used in dy-
namic games of incomplete information - perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium,
perfect bayesian equilibrium - all yield the same equilibrium outcomes. The same is
not true in the game with frequent reviews - all information sets are not reached with
strictly positive probability. Following Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and others working
on similar problems, I look for sequential equilibria (Kreps and Wilson (1982)). I
restrict my attention to pure strategies. We know from Kreps and Wilson (1982)
that an equilibrium in mixed strategies always exists. The same is not true when
players use pure strategies at every information set, in that it is possible that for
some parameter values there is no equilibrium.
Since the game ends two periods after the review, there is no incentive for the
agent to choose anything except his preferred action after the review4. Knowing this
I limit the subsequent analysis to everything that happens up until (and including)
the review, taking post review actions in equilibrium as fixed.
The agent makes decisions twice before the review (and then twice after, if he is in
office). However, these decisions are made back to back, before any signals arrive or
the principal moves, thus they can be rolled into one decision. With that in mind, let
the agent’s pre-review strategy (henceforth strategy) be given by ba = (bx, by), where
bx, by ∈ Aˆ ≡ {XX,XY, Y X, Y Y }. bx and by denote the actions chosen by the type
x and type y agent respectively. Further if the agent of type i picks actions bi ∈ Aˆ,
denote by q(bi) = (qSXSX , qSXSY , qSY SX , qSY SY ) the probability of observing signals
Sˆ ≡ {SXSX , SXSY , SY SX , SY SY } respectively. Under assumption (i) q(bi) > 0 for
4If type x is re hired, he picks X in both post review periods. If type y is re hired, he picks Y in
both post review periods. If the agent is fired, then with probability α nature selects a type x agent
who picks X for two subsequent periods and with probability 1 − α nature selects a type y agent
who picks Y for the two subsequent periods.
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all bi ∈ Aˆ. For example, if the agent chooses ba = (XX,XX), then the principal
observes signals {SXSX , SXSY , SY SX , SY SY } with probability θ1Xθ2X , θ1X(1−θ2X), (1−
θ1X)θ
2
X and (1− θ1X)(1− θ2X) respectively, all of which are strictly positive.
In equilibrium the principal’s prior on the distribution of types coincides with the
actual distribution. Denote by γ0 = (γ0x, γ
0
y) = (α, 1−α), the principal’s prior beliefs
on the distribution of agent types in equilibrium. There are 4 information sets for
the principal, each corresponding to a pair of signals in Sˆ. Each of these information
sets has 8 nodes in it. For example the information set where the principal observes
the signal SXSX could be reached by X or Y playing any of the 4 actions in Aˆ
available to them. The principal’s strategy specifies what he does at each of the 4
information sets described above and is denoted by bp = (bSXSX , bSXSY , bSY SX , bSY SY ),
where bs1s2 ∈ P ≡ {k, f} for all s1s2 ∈ Sˆ. Let Pˆ = {k, f}4. Due to assumption (i)
we know that for every action of the agent there is one signal that is generated with
the highest probability. With slight abuse of notation, I denote by bbi ∈ {k, f} the
principal’s action at the information set generated with highest probability by action
bi ∈ Aˆ. So, if bi = XX, then the signal generated with the highest probability is
SXSX . Then bXX denotes the principal’s action on observing the signal SXSX .
Denote by Prob(keep, bi, bp) the total probability of agent i being kept on by
the principal after the review given bi and bp. This probability does not depend
on what the other type of agent chooses. Denote by BRp(bx, by) and BRi(bp), where
i ∈ {X, Y }, the set of actions that are the best response of the principal and the agent
of type i respectively. Further, let uˆi(bi) be the pre-review utility that accrues to the
agent if he chooses bi ∈ Aˆ. For example, if bi = XX, then uˆi(bi) = ui(X) + ui(X).
Upon observing signal s1s2 ∈ Sˆ, the principal updates his prior according to the
Bayes’ rule, which he is able to do at every information set since every information
set of the principal is reached with strictly positive probability no matter what the
agent chooses. As a consequence, consistent beliefs Kreps and Wilson (1982) can be
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derived using Bayes’ rule at each of the principal’s information sets for all ba. Let the
posterior be denoted by γr = (γrx, γ
r
y), where the r in the superscript stands for “at the
time of review”. In what follows I look for equilibrium assessments (strategy-belief
pair) however, since beliefs are implied in a straightforward way by the strategies,
refer to them as equilibrium strategies.
I refer to actions in which the agent of either type chooses the same action, i.e.
(bx = by), as pooling actions. For actions in which the two types of the agent use
different actions (bx 6= by) I use the term separating actions. If both types of agents
pick their preferred action in both periods (bx = XX, by = Y Y ), I refer to the action
as a true to type separating (t-t-t) action.
Equilibria in which the agent chooses pooling, separating, t-t-t actions are called
pooling, separating, t-t-t equilibria respectively.
The rest of the analysis proceeds as follows. The principal has 16 (24) strategies
available to him. The first lemma reduces the strategies of the principal that need to
be considered in the subsequent discussion. Lemma 2.2 characterizes the principal’s
best response function. Then I discuss the agent’s incentive to deviate, and how it
can be thought of as the sum of two components - the change in pre review utility
and the change in probability of being retained after the review. Finally, I present
three propositions that characterize the equilibria.
Lemma 2.1. For all τi ∈ [0, ui(i)], i = {1, 2} there is no equilibrium in which the
principal chooses bp ∈ {(k, k, k, k), (f, f, f, f)}.
Proof. I consider two classes of strategies that the agent might use and argue that in
each of these cases (k, k, k, k) or (f, f, f, f) can never be used in an equilibrium.
Suppose the two types of the agent choose different actions in either of the periods.
The principal’s posterior assigns the highest probability to facing type x and type y
to distinct information sets. He, then, fires the agent at the information set where
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he believes he is facing the type y agent with the highest probability and keep the
agent at the information set where he believes he is facing the type y with the highest
probability. Neither (k, k, k, k) and (f, f, f, f) will be used.
Suppose instead, the two types of the agent choose the same actions in both pe-
riods. Then principal’s prior and posterior are identical and he is indifferent between
keeping and firing the agent at each information set. Now further, suppose he does
choose to play (k, k, k, k) or (f, f, f, f). At least one of the types of the agent must
then be choosing at least one action that is not their most preferred action. Deviat-
ing to choosing their most preferred action does not change the probability of being
fired and makes that type of the agent strictly better off. So, (k, k, k, k) or (f, f, f, f)
cannot arise in this kind of equilibrium either.
Lemma 2.1 is going to be implicitly used in all the subsequent analysis. kkkk
and ffff are the only two strategies of the principal under which the agent can
unilaterally deviate to any action without changing the probability of being retained in
his current position. Removing these strategies from those that need to be considered
is crucial in pinning down the incentives of the agent to deviate profitably from a
strategy profile.
The second lemma identifies the structure of the principal’s best response corre-
spondence for pooling and separating actions.
Lemma 2.2. Let ba = (bx, by). If bx 6= by then bp ∈ BRp(bx, by) is such that bbx = k,
bby = f . If instead bx = by then BRp(b, b) = Pˆ \ {(k, k, k, k), (f, f, f, f)}.
Proof. Suppose the agent uses the strategy ba = (bx, by) and the principal observes
the signal s1s2 and updates his posterior belief on the distribution of types before the
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review. Using Bayes’ rule, we get:
γrx =
αqs1s2(bx)
αqs1s2(bx) + (1− α)qs1s2(by)
and
γry =
(1− α)qs1s2(by)
αqs1s2(bx) + (1− α)qs1s2(by)
γr is well defined since qs1s2(bx), qs1s2(by) > 0 for all bx, by. The principal keeps the
agent he is facing at that information set if
2γrxv(X) + 2γ
r
yv(Y ) ≥ 2αv(X) + 2(1− α)v(Y )
the above inequality can be rearranged and simplified to yield
α(1− α){qs1s2(bx)− qs1s2(by)}{v(X)− v(Y )}
αqs1s2(bx) + (1− α)qs1s2(by)
≥ 0
Since v(X) > v(Y ) the above inequality holds if and only if
qs1s2(bx) ≥ qs1s2(by) (2.1)
Thus at any information set, the principal keeps the agent he is observing if
qs1s2(bx) ≥ qs1s2(by), fires the agent he is facing if qs1s2(bx) ≤ qs1s2(by) and is indifferent
between keeping and firing if qs1s2(bx) = qs1s2(by). Since at every s1s2, qs1s2(bx) ≥
qs1s2(by) or qs1s2(bx) ≤ qs1s2(by) and thus the principal’s best response set is non
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empty.
Further, when bx = by, that is the agent chooses a pooling action, then qs1s2(bx) =
qs1s2(by) and the principal is indifferent between keeping and firing the agent. In this
case BRp(b, b) = Bp \ {(k, k, k, k), (f, f, f, f)}. When bx 6= by, then bp(bx) = k and
bp(by) = f .
Next, I study the structure of the best response correspondence of the agent.
Suppose the principal uses strategy bp ∈ Pˆ \ {(k, k, k, k), (f, f, f, f)} and the type
i, i ∈ {X, Y } agent chooses bi ∈ Aˆ, he gets:
U(bi; bp) = uˆi(bi) + 2Prob(keep, bi, bp)ui(i) + 2(1− Prob(keep, bi, bp))τi
If instead, he unilaterally deviates to b˜i ∈ Aˆ, he gets:
U(b˜i; bp) = uˆi(b˜i) + 2Prob(keep, b˜i, bp)ui(i) + 2(1− Prob(keep, b˜i, bp))τi
This deviation is profitable if and only if:
uˆi(b˜i)− uˆi(bi) + 2(Prob(keep, b˜i, bp)− Prob(keep, bi, bp))(ui(i)− τi) > 0 (2.2)
Since τi ≤ ui(i) we have that ui(i)− τi ≥ 0. Thus the gains from deviation can be
broken down into two components:
1. uˆi(b˜i)− uˆi(bi): the gain in pre-review utility.
2. (Prob(keep, b˜i, bp)−Prob(keep, bi, bp))(ui(i)− τi): the gain from the probability
of being retained following the review.
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The following propositions characterize the set of equilibria. I start by showing
that there no separating equilibria that are not t-t-t. Next, I show that separating
equilibria exist for higher values of outside options and pooling equilibria may exist
for lower values.
Proposition 2.1. Every separating equilibrium is t-t-t.
Proof. Consider a separating action that is not t-t-t, and pick any bp ∈ BRp(bx, by).
I will show that such an action can never arise in equilibrium.
Since ba is a separating action that is not t-t-t, there is at least one agent, say
agent i, and a strategy b˜i ∈ Aˆ such that uˆi(bi) < uˆi(b˜i). Further, for any b˜i ∈ Aˆ\{bi},
Prob(keep, bi, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜i, bp) ≤ 0. Then from (2.2) we know that agent i can
unilaterally deviate to b˜i and do strictly better. Thus ba can’t arise in equilibrium.
The intuition behind the result is simple. When the two types of the agent use
different actions the principal is able to tell which agent is most likely facing. He
then proceeds to fire the type y agent and keep the type x agent, irrespective of
which actions they chose. As a result there is no incentive for the agent to choose
anything other than his most preferred action. Thus any separating equilibrium that
might exist must be t-t-t.
In a true to type separating equilibrium bx = XX and by = Y Y . From lemma 2.2
we know that the principal will keep on observing signal SXSX and fire on observing
SY SY . The principal’s best response on observing the other two information sets
depends on the value of the θ’s, that is BRp(XX, Y Y ) ∈ {kkkf, kkff, kfkf, kfff}.
When the agent uses t-t-t actions, neither of the types of the agent can deviate
and improve their pre-review utility for any bp. Further, for any bp ∈ BRp(XX, Y Y ),
the type X agent can’t deviate to any other strategy and increase the probability of
being retained. Thus the type x agent has no incentive to deviate. This also implies
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that the existence of a t-t-t equilibrium does not depend on τx. The same is not
true for the type y agent. While it continues to be true that he can’t deviate and
increase his pre-review payoff; he can increase his probability of being retained. The
key trade-off here is the loss of pre-review utility versus the gain in the likelihood of
retention. If the gain in probability of retention does not compensate the agent for
the loss of pre-review utility then the t-t-t action is an equilibrium. Further, from
inequality (2.2) note that as τy increases, the left hand side decreases. The following
proposition follows directly from inequality (2.2).
Proposition 2.2. There exists 0 ≤ τ I∗ < uY (Y ), such that there exists a t-t-t equi-
librium for all τ ≥ τ I∗ and there is no t-t-t equilibrium for τ < τ I∗
To summarize, the only separating equilibria that can exist in this model are t-t-t
separating equilibria. For a given set of parameters, a t-t-t equilibrium is more likely
to exist for high values of τy.
Next, I turn my attention to pooling equilibria. When both types of the agent
pool by choosing the same action in both periods, the principal’s posterior at every
information set coincides with his prior as shown in lemma 2.2. The principal is
indifferent between keeping and firing the agent at every information set. Thus,
unlike separating actions, the principal’s best response function can’t be used to
narrow down the set of profiles that may arise in pooling equilibria.
Pooling equilibria may arise at any of the actions of the set Aˆ and in every pooling
action there is at least one agent who can unilaterally deviate and increase his pre-
review utility. From inequality (2.2) it is clear that for any of these pooling actions to
arise in equilibrium it must be that the probability of being retained strictly decreases
from deviating to any other strategy. Not only that, it must decrease enough to make
the gain in pre-review utility insufficient to compensate for reduction in retention
probability. This fact makes it possible to narrow down the candidates for pooling
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equilibria. The strategy profiles that can be pooling equilibria are given in appendix
1.
As discussed above the crucial incentive that makes it possible for pooling equi-
libria to exist in this model is the increased probability of being fired by deviating.
From inequality (2.2) it can be seen that as τx and τy increase, the second term of
the left hand side decreases. The decrease in retention rate becomes less important.
In fact, as the following proposition shows, if a pooling equilibrium exists for τi = 0,
then as τi increases the pooling equilibrium continues to exist until some cutoff τ
I∗∗
after which it no longer exists.
Proposition 2.3. If there is a pooling equilibrium for τi = 0
5 then there exists a
0 < τ I∗∗i < Eui, where Eui = αui(X) + (1 − α)ui(Y ), such that there is pooling for
every τi ≤ τ I∗∗i and no pooling for τ I∗∗i < τi.
Proof. Consider the pooling equilibrium in which both types of agents choose XX.
From lemma 2 we know that the principal is indifferent between keeping and firing
at every information set. We also know from observation 4 there are only 3 strategies
of the principal that can arise in equilibrium - (k, k, k, f), (k, f, f, k), (k, f, f, f). In
either of these strategy profiles the type x agent has no incentive to deviate and the
existence of the equilibrium does not depend upon τx. That said, for these profiles
to be equilibria the type y agent must not have an incentive to unilaterally deviate.
In order for Y to not have the incentive to deviate from XX to b˜Y ∈ {XY, Y X, Y Y }
the following condition needs to hold:
2uY (X)− uˆY (b˜Y ) + 2{Prob(keep,XX, bp)−Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)}{uY (Y )− τy} ≥ 0
5The existence of pooling at XX depends only on τy, that of pooling at XY and Y X depends
on both τx and τy and of pooling at Y Y depends only on τx. Given this, is there a better way to
state this theorem?
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If the inequality holds for all b˜Y for a value of τy and bp then (XX,XX, bp) is
a pooling equilibrium. Notice that 2uY (X) − uˆY (b˜Y ) < 0. If the above condition
holds, it must be that {Prob(keep,XX, bp)−Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)} > 0 and the gain in
probability of being kept from playing XX overwhelms that loss of pre-review utility.
As τy increases the left hand side of this inequality becomes smaller. If the above
conditions hold for all b˜Y for τy = 0, then they also hold for τy =  > 0, where → 0.
For each b˜Y , let the value of τy that makes left hand side equal to 0 be τy,b˜Y . Then
τy,b˜Y is given by:
τy,b˜Y =
2uY (Y ){Prob(keep,XX, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)} − uˆY (b˜Y ) + 2uY (X)
2{Prob(keep,XX, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)}
From the argument made above, notice that τy,b˜Y > 0. Further, we can compare
τy,b˜Y with EuY . With a little algebra it can be shown that if b˜Y = {XY, Y X} then
EuY − τy,b˜Y =
(1 + 2α{Prob(keep,XX, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)})(uY (Y ) + uY (X))
{Prob(keep,XX, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)}
If instead b˜Y = {Y Y } then
EuY − τy,b˜Y =
2α{Prob(keep,XX, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)})uY (X)
{Prob(keep,XX, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)}
+
2(1− α){Prob(keep,XX, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)}uY (Y )
{Prob(keep,XX, bp)− Prob(keep, b˜Y , bp)}
In either case EuY − τy,b˜Y > 0 and so EuY > τy,b˜Y .
Set τ ∗∗y = minb˜Y τy,b˜Y . Clearly, 0 < τ
∗∗
y < EuY . Further, if XX was a pooling
equilibrium for τy = 0, then it continues to be a pooling equilibrium for 0 < τy < τ
∗∗
y .
Analogous arguments can be used to show that the same result applied for pooling
equilibria at XY, Y X, Y Y .
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Thus, when the outside option of the agent is low then review is likely to fail in its
primary objective of weeding out employees who are a bad match for the firm. The ill-
matched employee has the incentive to blend in with the well-matched employee and
try to game the review process. That said, as the outside options increase, this stops
being the case and the ill-matched employees reveal themselves during the review.
Example 2.1. Suppose τx = τy = 0 and the rest of the parameters have the following
values:
θ1X = 0.9 θ
2
X = 0.8
θ1Y = 0.7 θ
2
Y = 0.6
uX(X) = 4 uX(Y ) = 2
uY (X) = 2 uY (Y ) = 3
Then (XX,XX, kfff), (XY,XY, fkff) and (Y X, Y X, ffkf) are (pooling) equi-
libria. On setting uX(X) = 3 while keeping all other parameter values the same,
(Y Y, Y Y, fffk) is also an equilibrium in addition to the above four.
The values of τx and τy can be increased all the way to 1.2 and all of the pooling
equilibria that existed for τi = 0 continue to exist. For very low values of τy the
model doesn’t have t-t-t separating equilibria but for all τy > .6, the model has a t-t-t
separating equilibrium. In fact, for .6 ≤ τy ≤ 1.2, the model has both pooling and
t-t-t equilibria. The model displays multiplicity of equilibria for several parameter
values.
It is worth noting that inequality (2.2) can be rearranged for all bi, b˜i and bp such
that the incentive of the agent to deviate depends on the ratio of the cost of choosing
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one’s preferred action, ui(i)− ui(j), and the cost of being fired, ui(i)− τi. Let
uX(X)− uX(Y )
uX(X)− τx = φX and
uY (Y )− uY (X)
uY (Y )− τy = φY
Thus, inequality (2.2) can be rewritten in terms of (Prob(keep, b˜i, bp)−Prob(keep, bi, bp)),
φX and φY .
The example that follows illustrates the pooling and separating equilibria for a
special case.
Example 2.2. Set θ1X = θ
2
X = θ
1
Y = θ
2
Y = θ and φX = φY = φ. In the following
figures the shaded region shows the values of θ and φ for which different equilibria
exist in this model. On the X-axis I show values of φ and on the Y-axis values of θ.
Figure 2.3 shows the region where t-t-t equilibria exist and Figure 2.4-Figure 2.6 show
the regions where the pooling equilbria exist.6 The first thing to note from Figure 2.3-
Figure 2.6 is that in this case an equilibrium always exists. As mentioned earlier, this
is not true for the general case. Secondly, as in example 2.1, there is multiplicity, in
that there are parameter values for which there is more than one equilibrium.
(a) Equilibrium I (b) Equilibrium II-III (c) Equilibrium IV
Figure 2.3: Parameters for which t-t-t equilibria exist
6Equilibrium I = (XX,Y Y, kkkf), Equilibrium II=(XX,Y Y, kkff), Equilibrium
III=(XX,Y Y, kfkf), Equilibrium IV=(XX,Y Y, kfff), Equilibrium 1a-1c = pooling equilib-
ria with bx = by = XX, Equilibrium 2a-2c=pooling equilibria with bx = by = XY , Equilibrium
3a-3c=pooling equilibria with bx = by = Y X, Equilibrium 4a-4c=pooling equilibria with
bx = by = Y Y
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(a) Equilibrium 1.a (b) Equilibrium 1.c
Figure 2.4: Parameters for which pooling equilibria at XX exist
(a) Equilibrium 2.a-3.a (b) Equilibrium 2.b-3.b (c) Equilibrium 2.c-3.c
Figure 2.5: Parameters for which pooling equilibria at XY and Y X exist
(a) Equilibrium 4.a (b) Equilibrium 4.c
Figure 2.6: Parameters for which pooling equilibria at Y Y exist
Proposition 2.2 and 2.3 showed that increasing the value of τ makes is easier for
the conditions for separating equilibria to hold and harder for conditions for pooling
equilibria to hold. Increasing τ is equivalent to increasing φ. These results can be
clearly seen in these figures as well.
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2.3.4 Equilibria in model with frequent reviews
In this section, I analyze the model where review occurs more frequently (twice, once
after every action). I compare the equilibrium outcomes under the two review regimes
(intermittent and frequent). I examine t-t-t and pooling equilibria and argue that
analogous results to proposition 2.2 and 2.3 continue to hold in this model. Further,
I compare thresholds at which pooling stops existing under the two review regimes in
the special case where θ1X = θ
2
X = θX and θ
1
Y = θ
2
Y = θY . The efficacy of the review
depends on how θX and θY compare and on the order of the pooling actions. In
particular, I show that whether or not frequent reviews are better than intermittent
review depends on several factors.
As before, a true to type (t-t-t) action is one in which the agent chooses his
preferred action every time it is his turn to move. A pooling action is one in which
both types of the agent choose identical actions in each period. For example, a pooling
action at XY is when in the first period both types of the agent choose X and in the
second period they both choose Y at every information set. Finally, in this model
there exist separating equilibria that are not t-t-t.
Once again, at the very last decision making period, whichever agent is in office
picks his favorite policy in equilibrium and thus, I treat that as fixed and only consider
decisions up to and including the second review. Further, if the agent is fired after
the first review, then the game that follows is as shown in Figure 2.7. I discuss the
subgame in detail for two reasons. First, because it is a subgame of the current game
and the outcomes are relevant to the subsequent analysis. Secondly, because it is
useful in understanding the results in the model with intermittent review.
There are four strategies available to the agent - {(X,X), (X, Y ), (Y,X), (Y, Y )}.
The principal has two information sets. At the first information set, he observes
the signal SX and at the second information set he observes the signal SY . Thus,
the principal’s strategies can be one of the following - {kk, kf, fk, ff}. Since all
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Figure 2.7: Game tree for model with one decision, one review
information sets are reached with strictly positive probability, calculating consistent
beliefs associated with every strategy using Bayes’ rule is straightforward.
It can be shown that in equilibrium, the principal’s strategies {kk, ff} are never
used7. Further, it can be shown that the best response of the principal to the agent
choosing (X, Y ) is kf and to (Y,X), it is fk 8. The agent’s incentive to deviate can
be broken down into gains in pre review utility and gain in the probability of being
retained.
(Y,X, fk) is not an equilibrium because the agent of type y can unilaterally deviate
to choosing Y and gain pre review utility as well as increase the probability of being
kept. Thus there is no separating equilibrium that is not true to type. In the model
with two decisions before the review, the same is true and is stated as proposition
2.1.
7See the Lemma 1, which shows the 2 decision analogue of this claim.
8See Lemma 2
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Strategy profile (X, Y, kf) is the t-t-t separating action profile and the only can-
didate to be a t-t-t equilibrium. Notice that, neither of the types of the agent can
gain pre review utility by deviating. In addition, the type x agent can’t deviate and
increase the probability of being retained. As a result the type x agent has no in-
centive to deviate. The type y agent can deviate and choose action X and this will
increase his probability of being retained. However, as long as the following condi-
tion is satisfied, the agent will not have the incentive to deviate and (X, Y, kf) is an
equilibrium.
uy(Y )− uy(X)
uy(Y )− τy ≥ θ
2
X + θ
2
Y − 1 (2.3)
When the agent chooses (X,X) or (Y, Y ), the principal is indifferent between
keeping and firing the agent at every information set because his posterior on agent
distribution at the time of review is the same as his prior. If, however, he uses the
strategy fk in response to (X,X) the the agent of type y would unilaterally deviate
to choose Y . He would not only would gain pre review utility but would also increase
the probability of being retained. Thus the only possible strategy profile in which the
agent chooses (X,X) that could arise in equilibrium is (X,X, kf). The type x agent
has no incentive to deviate. The type y agent can gain pre review utility by deviating
but will also lose some retention probability. The profile is an equilibrium as long as
the following condition holds:
uy(Y )− uy(X)
uy(Y )− τy ≤ θ
2
X + θ
2
Y − 1 (2.4)
By a similar argument it can be shown that the only possible strategy profile
in which the agent chooses (Y, Y ) that could arise in equilibrium is (Y, Y, fk). The
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condition that needs to hold in order for this profile to be an equilibrium is
ux(X)− ux(Y )
ux(X)− τx ≤ θ
2
X + θ
2
Y − 1 (2.5)
Inequalities (2.3)-(2.5) can be used to infer the nature of t-t-t and pooling equilib-
ria in this model. The first thing to note is that as τy increases the left hand side of
inequalities (2.3) and (2.4) increases. In fact, when τy = uy(Y ) then inequality (2.3)
holds strictly and there is a t-t-t separating equilibrium and inequality (2.4) fails to
hold so there is no pooling at (X,X). Thus t-t-t equilibria are more likely to exist for
higher values of τy and pooling equilibria at lower values. This is exactly the content
of propositions 2.2 and 2.3.
Further, notice that for all possible parameter values either inequality (2.3) or
(2.4) holds. Thus an equilibrium always exists. While all the preceding conclusions
from the one-decision model turn out to hold for the model with two decisions, this
one does not. That is to say, that in the two decision case, an equilibrium does not
exist for all parameter values.
For any t-t-t separating and pooling action to be an equilibrium the above subgame
must have one of the equilibria specified above. For example, in a t-t-t equilibrium
it must be that in the above subgame the equilibrium is (X, Y, kf). Similarly, in a
pooling equilibrium where agents pool by playing X every time they are called upon
to move, the equilibrium of the above subgame must be (X,X, kf) and so on. Since
we know the conditions that need to hold in that subgame, I define the strategies of
all players restricted to the portion of the tree where the agent is retained at the time
of the first review for the rest of the analysis.
Let the agent’s strategy be denoted by ca = (cx, cy) ∈ A6, where ci ∈ A3 specifies
what the type i agent does before the first review and then after the first review if
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he is retained and the first period signals were SX and SY respectively. For example,
if cx = (X,X, Y ) then the agent of type x pick X before the first review, if he is
retained then if the signal before the review was SX he picks X again and if instead,
the signal was SY he picks Y . The principal’s strategy specifies what he does at the
first review upon observing each signal, and what he does after observing each signal
if he retained the agent in the first review. Of course, the principal also makes a
decision at the second review if he had fired the agent in the first review, but as
discussed earlier, we know what his best response will be in different equilibria that
can possibly arise in that subgame. Thus, we can think of the principal’ strategy as
dp ∈ P6, which specifies what the principal does on observing {SX , SY }, and if he
retains the agent, {SXSX , SXSY , SY SX , SY SY }.
The fact that I only consider t-t-t and pooling equilibria simplifies the analysis
considerably because it imposes the condition that the agent, irrespective of type,
chooses the same action at every information set if retained in the first review. As
a result, the agent’s strategy can be thought of as analogous to those in subsection
3.3, in that each type of agent makes one decision in the first period (before the
review) and then one decision in the second period (after the review). Denote by
da = (dx, dy) = (dx1dx2, dy1dy2) the agent’s (t-t-t or pooling) strategy, where dit is the
type i agent’s action at time t. For instance, a t-t-t strategy of the agent is (XX, Y Y ).
One of the big differences between this model and the model with intermittent
review is that not all information sets are reached with strictly positive probability. In
order to find consistent beliefs Kreps and Wilson (1982) for a strategy profile (da, dp),
I construct a purely mixed strategy (da,, dp,) which assigns probability 1 −  to the
action prescribed by (da, dp) at every information set and  to the other action. Since
the action set at every information set of every player is binary, this is can be done
for any (da, dp). For this purely mixed strategy profile, it is possible to construct
beliefs µ at every information set using Bayes’ rule. The limit of (da,, dp,, µ) needs
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to be sequentially rational to be an equilibrium assessment. As  goes to 0, (da,, dp,)
converges to (da, dp) by construction and µ converges to µ. The agent’s information
sets are always singletons and µ accordingly sets probability 1 to each of these. Both
of the principal’s information sets at the time of the first review are reached with
strictly positive probability and µ derives beliefs using the Bayes’ rule. Some of the
principal’s information sets following the first review might not be reached, but µ
being the limit of a purely mixed assessment is able to assign well defined beliefs to
the nodes at each of these information set. Let qs1(di1) be the probability of observing
signal s1 given that agent i chooses action di1. qs1s2(di1di2) denotes the probability of
observing signal s1s2 if the agent of type i chooses di1di2 if the principal retains the
agent in the first review. µ can be used to construct the posterior beliefs of the agent
about the distribution of types at every information set at the time of both reviews.
Let γr1 = (γr1x , γ
r1
x ) and γ
r2 = (γr2x , γ
r2
x ) be the principal’s belief about the distribution
of the type of agents at the time of the first and second review respectively. Then on
observing signal s1,
γr11x =
αqs1(dx1)
αqs1(dx1) + (1− α)qs1(dy1)
(2.6)
And if he retains the agent, then on observing s1s2
γr12x =
αqs1s2(dx1dx2)
αqs1s2(dx1dx2) + (1− α)qs1s2(dy1dy2)
(2.7)
For example, suppose the type x and y agents choose X and Y respectively,
every time they are called upon to choose. In the first review, the principal fires on
observing SY and keeps on observing sX . If he retained the agent in the first review,
then he chooses kfkf on observing signals SXSX , SXSY , SY SX , SY SY respectively.
2.3. Model 34
Thus, da = (XX, Y Y ) and dx1 = dx2 = X, while dy1 = dy2 = Y . On observing signal
SX
γr1x =
αθ1X
αθ1X + (1− α)(1− θ1Y )
Further, if he doesn’t fire the agent and subsequently observes signal SY , then
γr1x =
αθ1X(1− θ2X)
αθ1X(1− θ2X) + (1− α)(1− θ1Y )θ2Y
Notice that (2.7) is exactly the same as the posterior belief of the principal given
in lemma 2.2 and using the same argument we can characterize the best response of
the principal during the second review if he had retained the agent in the first review.
If qs1s2(dx1dx2) > (<,=)qs1s2(dy1dy2), then the principal keeps (fires, is indifferent
between keeping and firing) the agent. Thus, for t-t-t equilibrium the principal’s
best response lies in the set {kkkf, kkff, kfkf, kfff} and for pooling actions, that
principal is indifferent at every information set as in subsection 3.3.
Next, I consider the agent’s best response when he is called upon to choose an
action between the first and the second review. In order for the agent to be willing
to choose di2 rather than deviating to d˜i2, the following condition must hold:
ui(di2)− ui(d˜i2) + (Prob(keep, dp, di2)−Prob(keep, dp, d˜i2))(ui(i)− τi) ≥ 0 (2.8)
In the case of t-t-t actions, the above equation can be used to make an argument
identical to the one made in subsection 3.3 as well as earlier in this section. Type
x agent has no incentive to deviate. In order for type y not to deviate the gain in
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retention probability must be less than the loss in pre-review utility of deviation. This
yields the following condition which is identical to (2.3)
uy(Y )− uy(X)
uy(Y )− τy ≥ θ
2
X + θ
2
Y − 1
Inequality (2.8) can be used to identify the strategies of the principal that can
arise in equilibrium in the case of pooling actions using the same argument as in
subsection 3.3. In addition, it can be used to find the conditions that need to hold
for the agent to adhere to the pooling action. Unsurprisingly, these conditions are
identical to the ones derived earlier in this section for the subgame with one decision
and one review. For pooling at XX, Y X we need (2.4) and for pooling at XY, Y Y
we need (2.5).
Next, I consider the decision of the principal at the first review, having observed
the first signal. Let V (X, s1, dx2, dy2, dp2) be the principal’s expected payoff if the
retained agent on observing signal s1 is a type x agent. This payoff depends on the
strategy used by both types of agents and his own strategy in the second period. The
principal will keep the agent on observing signal s1 if
γr1x V (x, s1, dx2, dy2, dp2) + (1− µs1(X))V (x, s1, dx2, dy2, dp2) ≥ V (Γ)
where Γ is the equilibrium strategy profile in the subgame that ensues if the agent
is fired and V (Γ) is the expected payoff to the principal therein. For example, in
the analysis of a t-t-t equilibrium, the relevant equilibrium in the subgame following
firing is (X, Y, kf) and
V (X, Y, kf) = α[v(X)+θ2Xv(X)+(1−θ2XEv]+(1−α)[v(Y )+θ2Y v(Y )+(1−θ2Y )Ev]
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In the case of t-t-t equilibria, the continuation values received by the principal
upon keeping and firing the agent may not be the same depending on the strategy
that the principal is using at the second review. However, V (x, s1, dx2, dy2, dp2) ≥
V (y, s1, dx2, dy2, dp2). This coupled with the fact that the γ
r1 is more precise than γ0
implies that the best response of the principal is to keep on observing SX and fire on
observing SY .In the case of pooling equilibria, the continuation values that follow on
keeping and firing the agent are the same and the principal’s prior and posterior are
identical implies that the principal is indifferent between keeping and firing the agent
at every information set.
Finally, I analyze the decision that the agent makes before the first review. The
type i agent can choose di1 as prescribed by the strategy or unilaterally deviate to d˜i1.
In doing so, he changes his pre-review utility and the probability of being retained.
If the following condition holds, he has no incentive to unilaterally deviate:
ui(di1)−ui(d˜i1)+(Prob(keep, dp, di1)−Prob(keep, d˜i1))(U(di2, dp)−2τi) ≥ 0 (2.9)
where U(di2, dp) is the continuation value that the type i agent receives if he is
retained. In the case of a t-t-t equilibrium, U(di2, dp)−2τi ≥ 0 for both types of agents
and neither type of agent can increase his pre review utility by unilaterally deviation.
Further, the type x agent can’t even increase his probability of being retained by
unilaterally deviating. Thus he has no incentive to deviate. The type y agent can
increase his probability of being retained by unilaterally deviating and in order to
prevent him from doing some conditions need to be hold (given in appendix 2).
In case of pooling equilibrium, there is always at least one agent who can increase
his pre-review utility by unilaterally deviating. This gives a guideline for determining
what the principal will do at the time of the first review. It has to be true that the
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probability of being retained must strictly decrease on deviating to the non-pooling
action. In addition, some conditions need to hold in order to deter deviation. These
conditions are given in appendix 3.
Note from (2.8) and (2.9) that propositions analogous to 2.2 and 2.3 hold in this
model. These are given below.
Proposition 2.4. There exists 0 ≤ τF∗ < uY (Y ), such that there exists a t-t-t
equilibrium for all τ ≥ τF∗ and there is no t-t-t equilibrium for τ < τF∗
Proposition 2.5. If there is a pooling equilibrium for τi = 0
9 then there exists a
0 < τF∗∗i < Eui, where Eui = αui(X) + (1 − α)ui(Y ), such that there is pooling for
every τi ≤ τF∗∗i and no pooling for τF∗∗i < τi.
That is to say, that as τ increases separating equilibria exist and pooling equilibria,
if they existed, cease to do so. Thus, irrespective of the review regime low values of
τ will lead to a failure to weed out ill matched employees. Even though this is a
negative result, it does help understand the conditions under which reviews don’t
work well irrespective of how frequently they are conducted. Certain careers and
industries offer low outside options. In such environments, it might be difficult to
design reviews that work.
This proposition allows me to compare the thresholds for pooling equilibria for
the model with intermittent review and those in the model with frequent review for
the special case when θ1X = θ
2
X = θX and θ
1
Y = θ
2
Y = θY . Let τ
I∗∗
i and τ
F∗∗
i be the
thresholds at which pooling no longer exists for agent i under intermittent(I) and
frequent (F) review respectively. I find that
1. For pooling at XX: If θX > θY then τ
F∗∗
Y < τ
I∗∗
Y and if θX < θY then τ
F∗∗
Y > τ
I∗∗
Y
9The existence of pooling at XX depends only on τy, that of pooling at XY and Y X depends
on both τx and τy and of pooling at Y Y depends only on τx. Given this, is there a better way to
state this theorem?
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2. For pooling at Y Y : If θX > θY then τ
F∗∗
X > τ
I∗∗
X and if θX < θY then τ
F∗∗
X < τ
I∗∗
X
3. For pooling at XY : τF∗∗X < τ
I∗∗
X and τ
F∗∗
Y > τ
I∗∗
Y
4. For pooling at Y X: τF∗∗X > τ
I∗∗
X and τ
F∗∗
Y < τ
I∗∗
Y
The above inequalities show that the informativeness of the signals matters a great
deal.
I conclude the chapter by discussing the second kind of failure in reviews. As
shown in proposition 2.1, the model with intermittent reviews has no separating
equilibria that are not t-t-t. The same is not true for the model with frequent reviews.
In fact, there are several non-t-t-t separating equilibria. In any non-t-t-t separating
equilibrium, the probability of weeding out the ill-matched employee is higher than in
pooling equilibria but lower than in t-t-t separating equilibria. The reason is that the
principal bases his decision on signals generated by only one action rather than two.
This allows the ill-matched agent to mimic the well-matched agent in one period, not
get fired and then take his preferred action in other periods. In other words, frequent
reviews make “toeing the party line” less costly for the ill-matched employees. This
kind of failure, while more subtle, arises only with frequent reviewing.
Frequent reviews are by no means prima facie superior to intermittent reviews. In
fact, in certain environments intermittent reviews may fare better. If we add to that
the fact that more frequent reviews usually cost more, it becomes less obvious that
firms want to adopt them indiscriminately.
2.4 Conclusion and discussion
Performance reviews are a ubiquitous feature of employee management within firms
and that raises questions about their efficacy and the factors that might enhance or
diminish it. This paper shows that the outside options that an employee faces on
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leaving the firm can have a significant impact on the outcomes of the review process.
In particular, if the firm wants to use the annual reviews to weed out employees
who are a bad match for the firm, then it will fail to do so if the employees have
low outside options. However, the problem does not persist. If the outside options
increase then the incentives for the ill-matched type of the agent to try and blend in
with the “good” type disappear and ill-matched types can easily be weeded out by
the review.
I also show that changing the frequency of reviews doesn’t change the main result
- for low outside options more frequent reviews fail just as intermittent reviews fail.
More frequent review does not always fare better than intermittent review. The
quality of information has a significant bearing on the comparison of the two review
regimes. This finding has implications for the design of performance management
policies. In industries where outside options are low, either because they employ low
skill labor or because the skills learned on the job are not transferable to a different
job, this can be a serious concern. Performance reviews might not work, no matter
how often they are conducted and the firm might do well in searching for a more
effective mechanism to assess employee performance.
Chapter 3
Managerial effort and selection of
risky projects under limited
liability and risk neutrality
3.1 Introduction and motivation
Firms often hire executives to make decisions on their behalf. In different environ-
ments this leads to many interesting outcomes, several of which have been studied in
the contract theory literature. In this chapter, I study one such environment. A firm
is faced with the task of choosing between a risky and a safe project. There exists
information that can help the firm rank the projects, but it cannot learn this infor-
mation without hiring an executive. With enhanced information it might be possible
to rank projects on a case by case basis and this gives rise to gains from information
acquisition. Further, it is prohibitively costly1 for the executive to communicate this
information to the firm. It, thus, needs to delegate the task of learning about the
project and subsequently choosing the project to the executive. Situations like this
arise in multiple contexts. For example, one of the tasks of hedge fund managers is
1One of the alternative scenarios studied in the literature is when the executive can communicate
the information to the firm, but might need the right incentives to report it correctly. See DeMarzo
et al. (2013) for a treatment of this problem.
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to learn about the investments and pick the right set on behalf of investors.
The key feature of this environment is that the firm wishes to delegate two in-
terrelated tasks - learning new information and using the information correctly. The
first task is costly to the executive and the second task is not2. Earlier papers have
shown that this problem suffers from twin moral hazard - in the costly as well as the
costless task. The latter is surprising and creates an interesting set of issues, which I
attempt to address with this work.
The model used in this paper is very similar to the one originally analyzed in
Lambert (1986). The paper showed that when the agent is risk averse and the prin-
cipal is risk neutral, the agent may take excessive or insufficient risk. Put another
way, despite learning the information, the agent picks different projects than what
the principal would want him to under the optimal contract. Hellwig (2009) argues
that it might not be possible to implement the first-best when there is a simultaneous
risk and effort choice in a moral hazard setting despite the fact that both contracting
parties are risk neutral. What then is the role of risk aversion in this context? I start
by reconciling the two findings. Can the first-best be implemented if the agent is risk
neutral? I find that a linear contract is able to implement the first-best outcome.
Thus, Lambert’s result is driven by risk aversion rather than the effect described in
Hellwig (2009). This is exactly in line with the findings of Grossman and Hart (1983).
The focus of the chapter, however, is the impact of having a limited liability
constraint for the agent. In most situations in which the agent assumes decision
making responsibilities on behalf of the principal, the agent has limited liability. I
study the problem in the presence of limited liability (and risk neutrality) and find
that, once again, there may not exist a contract that achieves first best. In fact,
the agent often chooses to take excessive/insufficient risk. Thus, limited liability not
2This is a simplifying assumption that allows me to detract from the additional incentives required
to motivate costly effort to execute projects.
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only raises the cost of the contract for the principal, it alters risk taking incentives.
Several papers before this have discussed this effect. In particular, they have shown
that limited liability constraints make risk taking more attractive. I discuss them in
the next section. However, in the planning and implementation problem of Lambert
this leads to a unique outcome. In particular, depending on the parameter values,
the agent either takes excessive or insufficient risk.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I start by discussing the existing
literature. Then, I describe the model, while pointing out the similarities and differ-
ences between my model and that of Lambert. I define the agent and the principal’s
problems. Subsequently, I drop the limited liability constraint and show that there
exists an optimal contract that implements the first-best outcome. The contract is
linear and induces the agent to choose the same projects as the principal would have.
Next, I use the first order approach to study some features of the optimal contract
when there is a limited liability constraint. I show that if the first-best outcome is
such that the risky project is more likely to be chosen by the principal under full
information, then the agent takes insufficient risk. The contract in this case is con-
cave. On the other hand, if the first-best outcome is such that the risky project is
less likely to be chosen under full information, then the agent takes excessive risk.
The contract is convex. The final section concludes and discusses some implications
of these results as well as the caveats.
3.2 Relationship to literature
The interest in delegating the task of acquiring information goes back to Demski
and Sappington (1987), who study the issues involved in hiring an expert to make
decisions on the principal’s behalf. The paper studies information acquisition and
information use (implementation) in the presence of costly information. The focus of
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the paper is the relationship between the moral hazard that arises in the information
acquisition phase and motivating action in the implementation phase. Since infor-
mation acquisition is costly, moral hazard along that dimension is not unexpected.
However, as Demski and Sappington point out, the implementation phase is costless
to the agent. The fact that there is moral hazard in the second agent choice (imple-
mentation), which is costless to the agent, is the central finding of this paper. The
underlying reason behind the difficulty in creating incentives for obtaining informa-
tion and implementation is the difference in the risk attitudes of the principal and the
agent. Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) extend the problem by studying the importance of
the curvature of the agent’s contract as a function of profit in providing incentives
to the agent to plan and implement. Once again, the paper studies the impact of
multiple model features - risk aversion of agent, the relationship of payoff and effort
during implementation. They find that the level of risk imposed on the agent by
the contract depends on the availability of risky growth opportunities and on the
effectiveness of monitoring institutions. This chapter demonstrates that non linear
contracts can arise in an environment with risk neutrality. The trade-off between ef-
fort and risk has also been studied by Hellwig (2009) who argues that it is not possible
to implement the first-best outcome when such a trade-off exists in conjunction with
moral hazard. The agent solicits funds from the principal. He then chooses how risky
a project should be and how much effort to give to the project. This paper shows that
when the choice of riskiness and effort are simultaneously unobservable then the first
best can’t be implemented. The paper also talks about the importance of technology
when it comes to examining double moral hazard. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween effort and investment turns out to be very important in determining the nature
and intensity of agency problems.
This chapter is also closely related to the literature on the impact of limited liabil-
ity. The central finding of this literature is that limited liability constraints don’t just
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make contracting expensive, they fundamentally change risk taking incentives. Sap-
pington (1983) studies the impact of limited liability on principal agent relationships.
The author finds that it becomes optimal for the principal to induce efficient actions
only in the most productive and least productive states of nature. This is because he
disproportionately bears the downside risk. In a related paper, Innes (1990) studies
the one dimensional moral hazard problem where an entrepreneur (agent) seeks to
design a contract that attracts investors (principals) for a project that require him to
make costly effort under limited liability. Just as in this chapter, both the principal
and agent are assumed to be risk neutral to detract from risk sharing issues. In the
absence of limited liability, a linear contract would be sufficient for motivating the
first-best outcome. However, limited liability makes risk taking more attractive. In
response to this excessive risk taking incentive, the agent designs a contract that lim-
its his own moral hazard by bearing as much risk as possible by using debt contracts
or live or die contracts. This makes the investment attractive to investors. He´bert
(2014) extends and generalizes these results. DeMarzo et al. (2013) studies the im-
pact of limited liability in the presence skimming - the principal does not observe the
payoff, the agent reports it and can under report if he wants. In the static model,
the agent can choose between a safe project or a risky project. The safe project gives
a return of 1 or 0. The risky project can give 1 with a higher probability, 0 with
a lower probability and with some probability causes a disaster. In addition, the
agent can skim from the returns. The principal wants to construct a contract that
provides incentives to choose the safe project and at the same time report the return
honestly. He needs to give high wages for reporting a high payoff or the agent will
skim. That creates incentives to gamble and the principal can’t punish the agent for
gambling because of limited liability. So he has to give the agent some transfer for
zero outcomes to distinguish them from disasters. Thus, the principal can induce the
safe outcome and even get truthful reporting, but it is costly. If instead, the principal
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can condition the contract on observing a disaster, he can reward the agent for all
non disaster outcomes and that makes it cheaper for the principal to implement his
chosen actions. So basically, if there is a disaster and the firm gets a zero it is optimal
to give the agent a bonus. This is cheaper than giving the agent a positive transfer
to zero output always.
As mentioned in the introduction, the work in this chapter is most closely re-
lated to Lambert (1986). I start by showing that Lambert’s results regarding exces-
sive/insufficient risk-taking in a delegating expertise problem (information acquisition
and use) depend on the risk attitude of the agent. In particular, the fact that he is
risk averse. Then I drop the risk aversion to detract from risk sharing concerns and
add a limited liability constraint. In line with the findings of previous literature, I also
find that limited liability does more than just raise the cost of the contract. Limited
liability changes changes the risk taking incentives in the model. Depending on the
parameter values, it might lead to excessive or insufficient risk taking. To the best
of my knowledge, this effect has not been documented in earlier literature. I discuss
the intuition behind this result and discuss the caveats of the analysis.
3.3 Model
There are two projects. One project is safe and it yields a fixed output, x0. The other
project is risky and can yield a high (xH) or a low (xL) output, where xL < x0 < xH .
In the absence of any effort, the common prior belief is that the risky project yields xH
with probability 0.5. However, there exists an option to exert effort to get information
about the risky project. The cost of effort3 is V . Upon exerting effort, the posterior
probability of the risky project becomes known - the risky project yields xH with
probability p, where p ∼ U [0, 1]. Notice, that the safe project is not always preferable
3This can alternatively be thought of as the cost of the information itself.
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to the risky project, or vice versa. The principal cannot observe p and must delegate
the task to an agent who has to decide whether or not to exert effort, and subsequently
which project to choose. Assume that the principal and the agent are risk neutral.
In addition, the agent has limited liability4.
Suppose the principal offers the agent a wage contract, w = (w0, wH , wL). If the
agent accepts the contract, exerts no effort and the output is xi, then he gets wi. If
he does exert effort he gets wi − V . If he rejects the contract he gets θ.
3.3.1 The first-best outcome
If the principal could observe whether or not the agent worked and also the p that
the agent observed, he could make the contract contingent upon working and making
the right decision. The principal wants the agent to pick the risky project as long as
pxH + (1 − p)xL ≥ x0. This gives a cut off value for p, say pf (first best), such that
the principal wants the agent to choose the risky project whenever p ≥ pf and the
safe one otherwise. The cutoff value is given by:
pf =
x0 − xL
xH − xL
With this cutoff, the total probability of observing x0, xH and xL is given by p
0
f ,
pHf and p
L
f respectively, where
4In Lambert (1986), the agent is risk averse and there is no limited liability. All other features
of the environment are identical.
3.3. Model 47
p0f =
∫ pf
0
f(p)dp = pf
pHf =
∫ 1
pf
pf(p)dp = 0.5(1− p2f )
pLf =
∫ 1
pf
(1− p)f(p)dp = 0.5(1− pf )2
(3.1)
Denote by EfX =
[
p0fx0 + p
H
f wH + p
L
fwL
]
. Notice that the firm can always do
better by finding out p than it can by picking the safe or the risky project without this
information because piI = EfX−max{x0, 0.5(xH +xL)} > 0. piI can be thought of as
the value of information. Put another way, if the information was free, the firm would
always want to make the informed decision rather than the uninformed decision. Let
EUIX = max{x0, 0.5(xH + xL)}. EUIX is the highest expected payoff that can be
obtained by making an uninformed choice. The principal will want the agent to exert
effort as long as exerting effort and choosing the cutoff pf yields a higher payoff than
not exerting effort and choosing the safe or the risky project. That is
EfX −max{x0, 0.5(xH + xL)} ≥ V (3.2)
I assume throughout that (3.2) holds.
Under the assumption of full information, the principal pays the agent a risk free
wage V + θ, conditional on the agent working and choosing the cutoff pf , and 0
otherwise.
Suppose the agent could costlessly (and truthfully) communicate the information
he learns to the principal. Then the principal only delegates the task of learning
the information to the agent and always picks cutoff pf . He could then pay the
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agent a flat wage of V + θ and get the first-best outcome. Choosing the project is
costless irrespective of who does it. As the analysis that follows shows, delegating
this costless task to the agent makes it impossible to achieve the first-best outcome
for some parameter values. This phenomenon is what Demski and Sappington (1987)
call spillover moral hazard.
3.3.2 Moral hazard
The interesting case, however, is when the principal cannot observe agent effort and
conditional on the agent making the effort, the posterior probability of xH . The moral
hazard problem arises from the fact that even though the principal can observe the
output, he can’t, for instance, distinguish between the following three situations:
1. The agent does not work and chooses the safe project.
2. The agent works and chooses the safe project knowing that it yields a higher
output than the expected output of the risky project.
3. The agent works and chooses the safe project even though it yields a lower
output than the expected output of the risky project.
Suppose the principal offers the agent w ∈ R3+, the agent chooses to accept the
contract, and subsequently to work. As long as wH ≥ wL the expected value of
picking the risky project, pwH + (1− p)wL, is increasing in p. The agent maximizes
his payoff by picking a cutoff value of p, say pˆ(w), given by
pˆ(w) =
w0 − wL
wH − wL (3.3)
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For all p ≤ pˆ(w) the agent will choose the safe project, and the risky project
otherwise. I limit my search to contracts5 in which wH ≥ wL.
This cutoff gives rise to probabilities p0(w), pH(w), pL(w) of observing outcomes
x0, xH , xL respectively, where
p0(w) =
∫ pˆ(w)
0
f(p)dp = pˆ(w)
pH(w) =
∫ 1
pˆ(w)
pf(p)dp = .5(1− pˆ(w)2)
pL(w) =
∫ 1
pˆ(w)
(1− p)f(p)dp = .5(1− pˆ(w))2
(3.4)
Using the above probabilities the principal chooses the contract to solve the fol-
lowing problem:
max
(w0,wH ,wL)∈R3+
p0(w)(x0 − w0) + pH(w)(xH − wH) + pL(w)(xL − wL) (3.5)
subject to
p0(w)w0 + p
H(w)wH + p
L(w)wL − V ≥ θ (3.6)
p0(w)w0 + p
H(w)wH + p
L(w)wL − V ≥ 0.5wH + 0.5wL (3.7)
p0(w)w0 + p
H(w)wH + p
L(w)wL − V ≥ w0 (3.8)
The constraints ensure that the agent accepts the contract (3.6), chooses to work
rather than shirk and always pick the risky (3.7) or the safe project (3.8). I refer to
the above problem as formulation 0. It turns out that formulation 0 can be restated
to make it more tractable. Later in the chapter I do so and call that formulation 1.
5Contracts in which wL < wH will induce the agent to pick a pˆ(w) such that, for all p ≤ pˆ(w),
he will pick the risky project.
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Let w∗0, w
∗
H , w
∗
L be an optimal contract and ps (second best) be the cutoff value
induced by this contract. I start by noting three characteristics of optimal contracts.
First, ps 6= {0, 1}. Suppose ps = 0, then p0(w∗) = 0 and pH(w∗) = pL(w∗) = 0.5.
Constraint (3.7) then becomes −V ≥ 0, which violates the assumption that V > 0.
A similar argument can be used to show that ps 6= 1. Setting ps = 1 would violate
constraint (3.8). In later proofs, this fact is used extensively.
Second, in any optimal contract w∗0 ∈ [w∗L, w∗H ]. Suppose w∗0 > w∗H , w∗L. Then,
w∗0 > p
0(w∗)w∗0+p
H(w∗)w∗H+p
L(w∗)w∗L and w
∗
0 > p
0(w∗)w∗0+p
H(w∗)w∗H+p
L(w∗)w∗L−
V . This violates (3.8). Suppose instead w∗0 < w
∗
H , w
∗
L then 0.5w
∗
H + 0.5w
∗
L >
p0(w∗)w∗0 + p
H(w∗)w∗H + p
L(w∗)w∗L and 0.5w
∗
H + 0.5w
∗
L > p
0(w∗)w∗0 + p
H(w∗)w∗H +
pL(w∗)w∗L − V violating (3.7). Thus, w∗H ≥ w∗0 ≥ w∗L. Hence, the principal’s problem
only needs one limited liability constraint, wL ≥ 0.
Finally, not all w∗i ’s are equal. That is, the principal doesn’t pay the agent a flat
wage in any optimal contract. If w∗H = w
∗
0 = w
∗
L then constraints (3.8) and (3.7) are
violated. This, along with the fact that w∗H ≥ w∗0 ≥ w∗L, implies that wH > wL, which
will be used later.
The rest of the analysis is organized as follows. First, I characterize the optimal
contract when the agent does not have limited liability. I do so by solving for the
optimal linear contract and then arguing that the optimal linear contract is optimal
among all contracts. Subsequently, I return to the case where the agent has limited
liability. Under some conditions on the parameters the above result still holds, but
it is not true for all parameter values. When the optimal linear contract fails to be
optimal in general, I study and discuss some characteristics of the optimal contract.
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3.3.3 Optimal contract in the absence of limited liability
Consider the principal’s problem without the limited liability constraint for the agent.
Suppose, the principal restricts his attention to contracts of the form:
wi = αxi + β (3.9)
where α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R. Notice from (3.3) that with a linear contract the agent
always uses the first-best cut off pf . That is, pˆ(w) = pf if w is given by (3.9) and
α 6= 0. Then, the probabilities p0(w), pH(w) and pL(w) are given by (3.1).
The principal’s problem is given below and represented by figure Figure 3.1. The
dotted line represents the set of (α∗, β∗) that are optimal.
max
α≥0,β∈R
(1− α)EfX − β (3.10)
subject to
αEfX + β ≥ V + θ (3.11)
α(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0} ≥ V (3.12)
Maximizing the objective function (3.10) is equivalent to minimizing αEfX+β. At
the optimum linear contract the participation constraint (3.11) holds with equality
and inequality (3.12) holds. The optimal contract (α∗, β∗) satisfies the following
conditions:
α∗EfX + β∗ = V + θ (3.13)
α∗(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0} ≥ V (3.14)
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β
α
α(EfX−max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL),x0}) = VαEfX+β= V+θ
1
(a) Case I
β
α
α(EfX−max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL),x0}) = VαEfX+β= V+θ
1
(b) Case II
Figure 3.1: Optimal Linear Contract without limited liability
The optimal contract implements the first-best cutoff and the expected payoff to
the agent is V + θ. As a result, there is no contract that can do strictly better. This
gives the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. In the absence of limited liability, there exists an optimal contract
which is linear.
Further, the optimal contract has the following characteristics.
• If V
θ
≥ piI
EUIX
then it is possible to find (α∗, β∗) such that β∗ ≥ 0
• If V
θ
< piI
EUIX
then β∗ < 0 for all optimal contracts that are linear.
Thus, Lambert’s result regarding excessive/insufficient risk-taking is due to risk
aversion. The optimal contract induces the first-best outcome if the agent is risk
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β
α
α(EfX−max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL),x0}) = VαEfX+β= V+θ
αxL+β= 0
(a) Case I
β
α
α(EfX−max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL),x0}) = VαEfX+β= V+θ
αxL+β= 0
Optimal Contract
(b) Case II
Figure 3.2: Optimal Linear Contract when xL > 0
neutral. However, that is not to say that his result is a peculiar feature of having a
risk averse agent. It turns out that adding limited liability generates a similar result.
Under limited liability the agent may capture some of the surplus if the principal
restricts his attention to linear contracts. To see this, I solve for the optimal linear
contract in the problem with limited liability. This contract would have to solve the
problem given by (3.10)-(3.12) along with the limited liability constraint αxL + β ≥
0. Let (α∗LL, β
∗
LL) be an optimal contract under limited liability. Figure Figure 3.2
represents the case in which xL > 0, however the analysis is the same for the cases in
which xL ≤ 0. When xL < 0, the line αxL + β = 0 is upward sloping and β∗LL > 0
for all optimal linear contracts. The dotted line represents the set of (α∗, β∗) that are
optimal in case I and in case II the optimal linear contract is a singleton. As long as
V
θ
≤ piI
(EUIX−xL) , the participation constraint holds with equality and there exists an
optimal contract that is linear. However if
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V
θ
>
piI
(EUIX − xL) (3.15)
then the participation constraint does not hold with equality in the optimal linear
contract. The optimal linear contract need not be optimal in general.
Thus, under some conditions the principal has to pay more than V + θ when
limited liability is imposed in the problem if he continues to use linear contracts. This
observation is in line with DeMarzo, 2013 DeMarzo et al. (2013) where the authors
show that the presence of a limited liability constraint makes the optimal contract
expensive for the principal. The size of this premium is given by the difference between
what the principal pays out in the optimal contract and V + θ and is denoted by PLL
PLL = V
(
EUIX − xL
piI
)
− θ
The above expression is strictly greater than zero whenever the participation con-
straint does not hold with equality in the optimal linear contract.
One of the advantages of studying linear contracts in this problem is that it
becomes possible to sidestep the fact that the objective function is not easy to work
with in formulation 0. This is one of the major differences between the problem at
hand and standard project choice problems with moral hazard. The presence of a
cutoff point introduces nonconvexities in the principal’s optimization problem. In the
next subsection I restate the problem to a form that is easier to work with. While
the new formulation continues to suffer from the same nonconvexities, it is possible
to get several insights from the first order conditions. I discuss this is greater detail
in the appendix.
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3.3.4 Optimal contract with limited liability
The next issue that this chapter seeks to address is the nature of the optimal contract
in the presence of limited liability. As shown in the previous section, in the presence
of limited liability the optimal linear contract may not be optimal in general. In order
to do so, I study the first order conditions of the principal’s optimization problem.
However, the objective function and the constraints in formulation 0 yield first order
conditions that are difficult to analyze because the total probability of observing each
outcome is a function (sometimes quadratic function) of w0−wL
wH−wL . In order to make
the first order conditions easier to analyze, I reformulate the problem by making pˆ
one of the choice variables along with (w), wH , wL). This approach was also used in
Lambert (1986).
As before, suppose the principal offers the agent a wage contract w = (w0, wH , wL) ∈
R3+ and the agent chooses a cutoff value pˆ such that for all p ≤ pˆ he picks the safe
project. Then, the total probability of observing outcomes x0, xH and xL as a func-
tion of pˆ is calculated using equations analogous to (3.4) and is given by p0(pˆ), pH(pˆ)
and pL(pˆ) respectively.
The agent chooses pˆ to maximize
p0(pˆ)w0 + pH(pˆ)wH + pL(pˆ)wL
This yields the first order condition
w0 − (pˆwH + (1− pˆ)wL) = 0
The above equation becomes one of the constraints in the principal’s optimization
problem when he chooses the agent’s contract. The principal’s problem can then be
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rewritten. I call this statement of the problem formulation 1.
max
(w0,wH ,wL)∈R3,pˆ∈[0,1]
p0(pˆ)(x0 − w0) + pH(pˆ)(xH − wH) + pL(pˆ)(xL − wL) (3.16)
subject to
p0(pˆ)w0 + p
H(pˆ)wH + p
L(pˆ)wL − V ≥ θ (3.17)
p0(pˆ)w0 + p
H(pˆ)wH + p
L(pˆ)wL − V ≥ w0 (3.18)
p0(pˆ)w0 + p
H(pˆ)wH + p
L(pˆ)wL − V ≥ 0.5wH + 0.5wL (3.19)
w0 − [pˆwH + (1− pˆ)wL] = 0 (3.20)
wL ≥ 0 (3.21)
Let λ, µ1, µ2, η, ξ be the lagrange multipliers for constraints (3.17)-(3.21). In what
follows, I use p0, pH , pL in lieu of p0(pˆ), pH(pˆ), pL(pˆ). Let λ
∗, µ∗1, µ
∗
2, η
∗, ξ∗ be the values
of the multipliers satisfying the first order conditions if the wage is w∗. Further,
let p∗0, p
∗
H , p
∗
L be the values of p0(pˆ), pH(pˆ), pL(pˆ) when pˆ = ps. Note that, while
λ∗ ≥ 0, µ∗1 ≥ 0, µ∗2 ≥ 0 and ξ∗ ≥ 0, η∗ can be positive, negative or zero.
In the appendix I prove several technical results about the multipliers. However,
the focus is on establishing the characteristics of η∗ and ξ∗. In particular, I show that
the sign of η∗ is closely related to excessive/insufficient risk-taking in the model. For
instance, lemma B.3 shows that if η∗ > 0, then ps < pf . This relationship is then used
to show that if pf > 0.5 then ps ∈ [0.5, pf ] and the agent takes excessive risk under
the optimal contract. Further, the optimal value of ξ∗ sheds light on whether or not
the limited liability constraint holds with equality in the optimal contract. I show
that η∗ and ξ∗ are either both zero or both non zero. Thus, contracts in which the
agent takes excessive/insufficient risk are also contracts in which the limited liability
constraint holds with equality.
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The first order conditions of the principal’s problem are given below6.
1 = λ∗ + µ∗1
p∗0 − 1
p∗0
+ µ∗2 + η
∗ 1
p∗0
(3.22)
1 = λ∗ + µ∗1 + µ
∗
2
p∗H − 0.5
p∗H
− η∗ ps
p∗H
(3.23)
1 = λ∗ + µ∗1 + µ
∗
2
p∗L − 0.5
p∗L
− η∗ (1− ps)
p∗L
+ ξ∗
1
p∗L
(3.24)
Σj∈{0,H,L}(xj − w∗j )
∂pj(pˆ)
∂pˆ
|pˆ=ps − η(w∗H − w∗L) = 0 (3.25)
Proposition 3.2 is one of the central results of this paper. It shows that if pf < 0.5
the agent takes insufficient risk by choosing a cutoff that is higher than pf . All proofs
and lemmas are relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 3.2. a) If pf < 0.5 then ps ∈ [pf , 0.5].
b) If pf > 0.5 then ps ∈ [0.5, pf ].
c) If pf = 0.5 then ps = pf .
When pf < 0.5, then under the uninformed prior the risky project yields a higher
expected payoff than the safe project. Thus, the contract needs to motivate the agent
to work rather than shirk and choose the risky project. To motivate the agent to work
the contract must make the safe project sufficiently attractive. Suppose we start by
dropping the limited liability constraint and picking an optimal linear contract. This
would make the safe project sufficiently attractive, the agent picks the cutoff pf and
the expected cost of the contract to the principal would be V +θ. Now let’s add back
the limited liability constraint such that the optimal linear contract no longer satisfies
it and wL has to be raised to 0, thus raising the payoff from the risky project. The
6The objective functions ((3.5), (3.16)) in both the formulations of the given problem are neither
concave nor quasiconcave (see appendix).
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agent would then start taking excessive risk, picking pˆ < pf . In addition, this contract
costs the principal more than V +θ, say V +θ+. The principal can do strictly better
by raising w0 and decreasing wH while keeping the costs V + θ+  and increasing the
cut off back to pˆ = pf . Can the principal do even better? Perhaps, he can. He could
continue to use a combination of raising w0 and decreasing wH such that pˆ > pf ,
while decreasing the expected cost of the contract to some value between V + θ + 
and V + θ. At this point, the principal faces the trade-off between decreasing the
cost of the motivating effort and decreasing the expected payoff from the project by
raising pˆ above pf . Proposition 3.2 shows that the two effects (motivating work and
reducing cost of contract while ensuring that the participation constraint is satisfied)
interact in a way to the optimal cutoff is higher than pf . The principal would rather
have the agent work and take insufficient risk than have him not work at all or pay
him a very large amount to work and pick the first-best cut off. If ps ≥ pf , then
w0 = pswH + (1− ps)wL ≥ pfwH + (1− pf )wL and the contract is concave (see figure
Figure 3.3).
Consider the alternative case where pf > 0.5. The expected payoff from the risky
project under the prior distribution is then lower than payoff of the safe project. Now
the principal needs to make the risky project sufficiently attractive. Once again, I
start from an optimal linear contract without limited liability and imposing a limited
liability constraint, the expected cost of the contract to the principal is higher than
V + θ and the agent uses a cutoff that is lower than pf , thus taking excessive risk.
Once again, keeping the costs constant (and higher than V + θ), the principal could
do strictly better by raising w0 and/or dropping wH such that the cutoff used by
the agent becomes pf once again. However, the principal can do potentially even
better by lowering costs. The only way that principal can lower costs is by lowering
w0 and/0r wH . Proposition 3.2 shows that the two effects (motivating work and
reducing cost of contract while ensuring that the participation constraint is satisfied)
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w∗0 = pswH + (1− ps)wL
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pfwH + (1− pf)wL
(a) pf < 0.5
x
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w∗
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w∗0 = pswH + (1− ps)wL
w∗H
w∗L
pfwH + (1− pf)wL
(b) pf > 0.5
Figure 3.3: Concavity and convexity of optimal contract
interact in a way to the optimal cutoff is lower than pf . The principal would rather
have the agent work and take excessive risk than have him not work at all or pay
him a very large amount to work and pick the first-best cut off. If ps ≤ pf , then
w0 = pswH + (1− ps)wL ≤ pfwH + (1− pf )wL and the contract is convex (see figure
Figure 3.3).
In what follows, I show that contracts in which the agent takes excessive/insufficient
risk are also contracts in which the limited liability constraint holds with equality.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose ps 6= 0.5. Then, ps 6= pf if and only if the limited liability
constraint is binding7.
Proposition 3.3 is particularly useful for the case where the optimal linear contract
is not optimal among all contracts. If ps 6= 0.5, whenever ps 6= pf , the multiplier on
7Actually, the more precise statement would be that the multiplier for the limited liability con-
straint is strictly positive. This of course implies that the constraint holds with equality. However,
of course, these are not identical statements.
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the limited liability constraint is strictly positive and xL = 0. Conversely, whenever
the multiplier on the limited liability constraint is strictly positive, ps 6= pf . Thus,
the presence of a limited liability constraint has a significant impact on the level of
investment in this model.
I bring the chapter to a close by returning to the case when optimal linear contract
is not optimal among all contracts. Recall that if V
θ
> piI
(EUIX−xL) , then the optimal
linear contract may not be optimal across all contracts. Proposition 3.3 further implies
that the optimal linear contract is not optimal across all contracts.
Corollary 3.1. If V
θ
> piI
(EUIX−xL) and pf 6= 0.5, then the optimal contract is not
linear.
Corollary 3.1 completes the characterization of contracts in this model. To sum-
marize:
1. If there is a limited liability constraint and pf = 0.5, then ps = 0.5 and the
optimal contract is linear. Note, that it need not be one in which the principal
pays V + θ.
2. If pf 6= 0.5
• If V
θ
≤ piI
EUIX−xL , once again, there exists an optimal contract that is linear.
The expected payoff to the agent is V + θ
• If V
θ
> piI
EUIX−xL and pf 6= 0.5 then the optimal contract is not linear.
There must be a non linear contract that is optimal. Then
a) If pf < 0.5 then ps ∈ (pf , 0.5].
b) If pf > 0.5 then ps ∈ [0.5, pf )
c) xL = 0 i.e. the limited liability constraint on xL holds with equality.
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3.4 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter studies the characteristics of the optimal contract when a risk neutral
principal delegates the task of choosing between a safe and a risky project to to a risk
neutral agent. The agent needs to exert costly effort to find information about the
riskiness of the project and subsequently choose the project. I find that the principal
uses a linear, concave or convex wage contracts under different conditions. Concave
contracts lead to insufficient risk taking and convex contracts lead to excessive risk
taking.
The results in this paper depend crucially on the assumption that the posterior
probability is distributed uniformly. This assumption guarantees that the first order
condition of the agent’s problem when he chooses the cutoff value pˆ is sufficient.
This feature makes it possible to rewrite the principal’s problem (formulation 0) such
that the first order conditions are tractable (formulation 1). Further, the assumption
implies that the expected payoff of the project when making an informed choice is
strictly concave. This is essential for establishing the relationship between pf and ps
(see proof of proposition 3.2). Extending this analysis to other posterior distributions
would be an interesting line of research.
As mentioned earlier the objective function of the principal’s problem is neither
concave nor quasiconcave. The first order conditions (3.22)-(3.25) are not sufficient.
However, it is straightforward to argue that a solution to the problem exists. The
objective function (3.5) is continuous. The constraint set is not compact, however
it can be made compact without altering the set of optimal solutions. Suppose, I
add the constraints that w0, wH , wL ≤ xH + x0 + ,  > 0 to the principal’s problem.
The maximum surplus that the principal can get from any project in any state of
the world is xH . Suppose the principal accepts a negative surplus in one state in
lieu of a positive surplus in other states such that the value of his objective function
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is at least zero8. The maximum negative surplus he would be willing to accept is
xH + x0, because that is the maximum that he can recoup as a positive surplus
in the other states. Recall that in all optimum contracts ps 6= {0, 1}. Thus the
constraints w0, wH , wL ≤ xH + x0 + ,  > 0 will never hold with equality and hence
imposing them will not alter the set of optimum solutions. These constraints do,
however, make the constraint set compact. Now, using the extreme value theorem
the principal’s optimization problem has a solution.
Numerous extensions of the analysis in this essay could be made by future research.
It would be fruitful to examine alternative distributions from which p could be drawn
that would be able to generate similar results. The characteristics of this set of
distributions could potentially shed light of the impact of information acquisition
devices on risk taking. Another possible extension is to examine the potential impact
of communication devices in this model. As argued earlier, information use itself is
costless and if it could be freely communicated to the principal there would be no
moral hazard. Introducing a communication device, even an imperfect or costly one,
could potentially decrease the wedge between the first and second best outcomes.
8If the value of the objective function is negative, then that wage contract can not be the optimum
because the principal can do better by not hiring the agent.
Chapter 4
Managerial effort and selection of
risky projects over time
4.1 Introduction and motivation
Most employee-employer relationships involve repeated interactions over time. In
some situations this can make it easier to implement the full information outcome.
However, there are many ways in which this repeated interaction can be organized.
In this chapter, I study the problem of implementing the first-best outcome when
the task described in chapter 3 is delegated to the agent for two periods rather than
one. I compare three contracting regimes - period-by-period contracting, two-period
contracting with no recontracting at date-1 and two-period contracting with recon-
tracting. I restrict my attention to the conditions under which the first best can
be implemented. Allowing the agent to recontract means allowing him to access his
outside option at date-1.
In this chapter, I show that contracting at date-0 for two periods while allowing
for recontracting yields the widest range of parameter values under which the first
best can be implemented. This implies that there exists a range of parameter values
for which it is not possible to implement the first-best outcome under period-by-
period contracting, however it is possible to do so under two-period contracting with
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recontracting. This suggests that contracting at date-0 for two periods while allowing
for recontracting offers an advantage over contracting period-by-period. I also derive
the conditions under which two-period contracting without recontracting is superior
to period-by-period contracting.
In chapter 3 the principal delegates the task of acquiring information and using
it to choose between a risky and a safe project to the agent. If
V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ θ
the linear contract implements the first best and is optimal. If this condition does
not hold, then the optimal contract is nonlinear and does not implement the first
best. In this chapter, I extend the analysis to a dynamic setting and compare the
threshold analogous to the one above for the three contracting regimes mentioned
earlier.
4.2 Period-by-period contracting
Recall the principal’s problem if he offers a linear contract to the agent for one period.
Let θ1 be the agent’s outside option when he first starts working with the principal
(date-0).
max
α≥0,β∈R
(1− α)EfX − β (4.1)
subject to
αEfX + β ≥ V + θ1 (4.2)
α(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0} ≥ V (4.3)
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αxL + β ≥ 0 (4.4)
Suppose the principal wants to hire the agent for a second period and the latter’s
outside option changes to θ2. The contracting problem remains the same, with the
exception of the participation constraint which is now αEfX +β ≥ V + θ2. We know
that in each of these one period problems there exists an optimal contract that is
linear and implements the first best if
V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ θi
Thus, if the principal and agent contracted period-by-period for two periods, there
would exist an optimal contract that is linear and implements the first best if:
V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ min{θ1, θ2} (4.5)
4.3 Two-period contracting with no recontracting
Now suppose the agent chooses projects twice, however the principal and agent con-
tract only once at date-0. Further, the agent is not allowed to exit the contract at
date-1. The principal is able to observe the outcome for both periods at the end of
date-1, but can’t he tell if the agent worked and whether the choices were made using
pf as the cutoff rule. I call this complete observability. An alternative assumption
would be that the principal observes a function of the output for the two periods
and not necessarily the order in which the output was realized. A special case of
this is that the principal observes the sum of the output in both periods. I refer to
this situation as partial observability. Later in this section I argue that replacing the
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complete observability assumption with partial observability does not alter the result.
Suppose the principal offers the agent the following contract
w =∈ R9+ = {w00, w0H , w0L, wH0, wHH , wHL, wL0, wLH , wLL},
where wij is the wage given to the agent when the output is {xi, xj}. The princi-
pal chooses wij’s such that the agent works in every period, and subsequently picks
projects optimally. If the agent rejects the contract he gets θ3 - the cumulative outside
option for two periods.
In order to formulate the principal’s problem I use backward induction. Consider
the agent’s decision at date-1. Notice that it doesn’t matter for the date-1 decision,
whether the date-0 outcome was a result of working or shirking. Suppose the agent
observed outcome i ∈ {0, H, L} at date-0. Then at date-1 the agent would choose the
risky project as long as p ≥ pˆi(w) where
pˆi(w) =
wi0 − wiL
wiH − wiL
Using this cutoff, the probability of observing x0, xH , xL at date-1 is given by
pi0(w), piH(w), piL(w).
The principal constructs his contract in a way that the agent would rather work
at date-1 than shirk and choose either the safe or the risky project. That is to say,
for every i ∈ {0, H, L}
pi0wi0 + piHwiH + piLwiL − V ≥ max{wi0, 0.5wiH + 0.5wiL} (4.6)
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Taking one step back, let’s consider the agent’s date-0 decision. I define Uˆi(w) and
Xˆi(w) for all i ∈ {0, H, L}. Let Uˆi(w) and Xˆi(w) be the date-1 continuation value of
the payoff to the agent and principal respectively if the agent chooses according to
(4.6) at date-1. That is:
Uˆi(w) = pi0wi0 + piHwiH + piLwiL − V
Xˆi(w) = pi0(xi + x0 − wi0) + piH(xi + xH − wiH) + piL(xi + xL − wiL)
From the point of view of the agent, the date-0 decision is exactly the same
as the date-1 decision following any i, with the exception that instead of receiving
{wi0, wiH , wiL} he will receive {Uˆ0(w), UˆH(w), UˆL(w)}. Let pˆ(w) be the cutoff that
the agent chooses at date-0, where
pˆ(w) =
Uˆ0(w)− UˆL(w)
UˆH(w)− UˆL(w)
This cutoff gives rise to the ex ante probabilities of observing the date-0 outcome
x0, xH and xL. I denote them by pˆ
0(w),pˆH(w) and pˆL(w) respectively. This gives two
more constraints for the principal’s problem:
pˆ0(w)Uˆ0 + pˆ
H(w)UˆH + pˆ
L(w)UˆL − V ≥ θ3
pˆ0(w)Uˆ0 + pˆ
H(w)UˆH + pˆ
L(w)UˆL − V ≥ max{Uˆ0, 0.5UˆH + 0.5UˆL}
The above constraints ensure that the agent accepts the contract and subsequently
chooses to work rather than shirk at date-0, given that he will choose according to
(4.6) at date-1.
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Thus, the principal solves the following problem:
max
w∈R9+
pˆ0(w)Xˆ0(w) + pˆ
H(w)XˆH(w)pˆ
L(w)XˆL(w) (4.7)
subject to
for every i ∈ {0, H, L}
pi0wi0 + piHwiH + piLwiL − V ≥ max{wi0, 0.5wiH + 0.5wiL} (4.8)
pˆ0(w)Uˆ0 + pˆ
H(w)UˆH + pˆ
L(w)UˆL − V ≥ θ3 (4.9)
pˆ0(w)Uˆ0 + pˆ
H(w)UˆH + pˆ
L(w)UˆL − V ≥ max{Uˆ0, 0.5UˆH + 0.5UˆL} (4.10)
Suppose the principal offers the agent a linear contract: wij = α1xi + α2xj + β,
where α1, α2 ≥ 0 and β ∈ R. Since the contract is linear the date-1 cutoff becomes pf
for all date-0 outcomes. Further, the ex ante probabilities pi0(w), piH(w) and piL(w)
become independent of i. In particular, they become p0f , p
H
f , p
L
f . Irrespective of what
the agent does at date-0, at date-1 he will get EfX. As a consequence, the date-0
cutoff also becomes pf . The principal’s problem is as follows:
max
α1,α2≥0,β∈R
(2− α1 − α2)EfX − β (4.11)
subject to
α2(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V (4.12)
(α1 + α2)EfX + β ≥ 2V + θ3 (4.13)
α1(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V (4.14)
(α1 + α2)xL + β ≥ 0 (4.15)
It is possible to restrict attention to contracts in which α1 = α2 without loss of
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generality. To see this, consider an arbitrary optimal contract,(α∗1, α
∗
2, β
∗), and define
α‘1 = α
‘
2 =
α∗1+α
∗
2
2
. The contract (α‘1, α
‘
2, β
∗) yields the same payoff to the principal
as (α∗1, α
∗, β∗) and satisfies all the constraints. Thus, it is also optimal. With this in
mind, I set α1 = α2, the objective function becomes:
(2− 2α)EfX − β
and constraint set becomes:
α(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V
2αEfX + β ≥ 2V + θ3
2αxL + β ≥ 0
Let β′ = β
2
and θ′3 =
θ3
2
. Then, the above equations become:
(1− α)EfX − β′
and
α(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V
αEfX + β
′ ≥ V + θ′3
αxL + β
′ ≥ 0
This is the same problem as (4.1)-(4.4). There exists an optimal contract that is
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linear and implements the first best if:
V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ θ′3 =
θ3
2
(4.16)
If the parameters of the problem satisfy (4.16) then in any optimal contract the
principal pays the agent an expected wage of 2V +θ3 and the agent chooses the cutoff
pf . Notice, that if min{θ1, θ2} < θ32 , for example if θ3 = θ1 + θ2, then for parameter
values such that:
min{θ1, θ2} < V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ θ3
2
the principal would be able to use a linear contract implementing the cutoff pf in
both periods and paying 2V + θ3 if he used two-period contracting, but not if he used
period-by-period contracting.
This result is not affected by observability. That is to say, suppose we restrict
what the principal observes at the end of date-1 to the sum of the output rather than
being able to tell when each quantity was realized, the result is unchanged. This is
because the optimal linear contract with equal alphas depends only on the sum of the
output in each period.
4.4 Two-period contracting with recontracting
Finally, I study the case where the agent can recontract at date-1. That is, at the
end of date-1 the agent can decide whether to stay with the principal or take his
outside option θ2. The limited liability constraint is imposed on the total wage paid
out to the agent, rather than his period-by-period payout. This is done to maintain
4.4. Two-period contracting with recontracting 71
consistency and comparability with the previous case.
Suppose the principal offers the agent wij = α1xi+α2xj+β1+β2, where α1, α2 ≥ 0
and β1, β2 ∈ R. I assume that if the agent chooses to leave at date-1, he receives
α1xi + β1 + θ2, where xi is the date-0 outcome.
The principal’s problem with recontracting is identical to the problem in the previ-
ous section with two exceptions. First, there is an additional participation constraint
- the date-1 participation constraint. Second, the outside option of the agent at date-0
is θ1 + θ2, rather than θ3. The problem is given below:
max
α1,α2≥0,β1,β2∈R
(2− α1 − α2)EfX − β1 − β2 (4.17)
subject to
α2EfX + β2 ≥ V + θ2 (4.18)
α2(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V (4.19)
(α1 + α2)EfX + β1 + β2 ≥ 2V + θ1 + θ2 (4.20)
α1(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V (4.21)
(α1 + α2)xL + β1 + β2 ≥ 0 (4.22)
The first two constraints ensure that the agent remains with the principal at date-1
and chooses to work. The subsequent two constraints guarantee that the agent accept
the contract and chooses to work at date-0. The last constraint is the limited liability
constraint.
By an argument analogous to the one in the previous section, I can restrict my
attention to the special case where α1 = α2 and β1 = β2 without loss of generality.
The objective function can be written as:
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2(1− α)EfX − 2β
and the constraints can be written as:
αEfX + β ≥ V + θ2 (4.23)
α(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V (4.24)
αEfX + β ≥ V + θ1 + θ2
2
(4.25)
α(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V (4.26)
αxL + β ≥ 0 (4.27)
Inequalities (4.24) and (4.26) are identical and one of them can be dropped. If
θ1 ≥ θ2, then θ1+θ22 ≥ θ2. Inequality (4.25) implies (4.23) and the above constraints
can be written as:
αEfX + β ≥ V + θ1 + θ2
2
α(EfX −max{(0.5xH + 0.5xL), x0}) ≥ V
αxL + β ≥ 0
These constraints are identical to (4.2)-(4.4) and thus there exists an optimal
contract that is linear and attains the first best if
V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ θ1 + θ2
2
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If θ1 < θ2, then
θ1+θ2
2
< θ2 then inequality (4.23) implies (4.25) and there exists
an optimal contract that is linear and attains the first best if
V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ θ2
Thus, there exists an optimal contract that implements the first best if
V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ max{θ2, θ1 + θ2
2
} (4.28)
Since max{ θ1+θ2
2
, θ2} > min{θ1, θ2}, we have that recontracting allows for a wider
range of parameter values under which an efficient outcome can be implemented.
That is, if
min{θ1, θ2} < V (EUIX − xL)
piI
≤ max{θ2, θ1 + θ2
2
}
the principal would be able to use a linear contract implementing the cutoff pf in
both periods and paying 2V + max{2θ2, θ1 + θ2} if he used two-period contracting,
but not if he used period-by-period contracting.
The expected payoff to the agent from the contract with recontracting is 2V +
max{2θ2, θ1 + θ2}, which is greater than or equal to the corresponding payoff from
period-by-period contracting, 2V+θ1+θ2. That raises the threshold value of
V (EUIX−xL)
piI
until which the first best can be implemented.
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4.5 Conclusion
Contracting over multiple periods can under some circumstances improve the effi-
ciency of the outcome. In this chapter, I compare three contracting regimes - period-
by-period contracting, two-period contracting without recontracting and two-period
contracting with recontracting. I find that two-period contracting with recontracting
expands the range of parameters under which the first-best outcome can be imple-
mented (using a linear contract).
The key take away from this chapter is that certain contracting regimes raise the
expected payoff to the agent without the actual outside options being higher. This
raises the upper bound for the set of parameters under which the first best can be
implemented. The choice of contracting regime depends on the trade off between the
minimum expected payoff under the participation constraint and the loss of payoff
induced by not using a linear contract.
While this essay sheds light upon the trade off between cost and risk taking in a
dynamic framework, it does not shed light on the characteristics of the optimal con-
tract. In the static framework, contracts could be linear, concave or convex because
of the fact that there were only 3 outcomes. In the dynamic framework, the principal
can choose from a richer set of contracts. A fruitful extension of this analysis would
be to shed light on the particular features of the two-period or multiperiod contract.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 2
A.1 Conditions for separating equilibria
Given below are the conditions that need to hold for separating actions to be be an
equilibrium.
If kkkf or kkff then
2(θ1X + θ
1
Y − 1) ≤ φY
If kfkf or kfff then
(2− θ2Y )(θ1X + θ1Y − 1) ≤ φY
A.2 Conditions for pooling equilibria
Given below are the conditions that need to hold for different pooling actions to be
equilibria.
1. Pooling at X
(a) φY ≤ θ2X + θ2Y − 1
(b) If uy(X) + θ
2
xuy(Y ) + (1− θ2x)τy − 2τy > 0 then
φY ≤ (1+θ
2
X)(θ
1
X+θ
1
Y −1)
θ1X+θ
1
Y
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(c) If uy(X) + θ
2
xuy(Y ) + (1− θ2x)τy − 2τy ≤ 0 then
No pooling
2. Pooling at Y
(a) φX ≤ θ2X + θ2Y − 1
(b) If ux(Y ) + θ
2
Y ux(X) + (1− θ2y)τx − 2τx > 0
φX ≤ (1+θ
2
Y )(θ
1
X+θ
1
Y −1)
θ1X+θ
1
Y
(c) If ux(Y ) + θ
2
Y ux(X) + (1− θ2y)τx − 2τx ≤ 0
No pooling
3. Pooling at XY
(a) φX ≤ θ2X + θ2Y − 1
(b) φY ≤ (1 + θ2Y )(θ1X + θ1Y − 1)
(c) If ux(Y ) + θ
2
Y ux(X) + (1− θ2y)τx − 2τx < 0
φX ≥ (1+θ
2
Y )(θ
1
X+θ
1
Y −1)
θ1X+θ
1
Y
(d) If ux(Y ) + θ
2
Y ux(X) + (1− θ2y)τx − 2τx ≥ 0
a and b are sufficient.
4. Pooling at YX
(a) φY ≤ θ2X + θ2Y − 1
(b) φX ≤ (1 + θ2X)(θ1X + θ1Y − 1)
(c) If uy(X) + θ
2
xuy(Y ) + (1− θ2x)τy − 2τy < 0 then
φY ≥ (1+θ
2
X)(θ
1
X+θ
1
Y −1)
θ1X+θ
1
Y
(d) If uy(X) + θ
2
xuy(Y ) + (1− θ2x)τy − 2τy ≥ 0 then
a and b are sufficient
Appendix B
Appendix to chapter 3
B.1 Lemmas and Proofs
The two lemmas that follow attempt to establish the relationship between µ∗1, µ
∗
2 and η
∗.
Both lemmas are used later for establishing the relationship between pf and ps.
Lemma B.1. If η∗ 6= 0 then at least one of µ∗1 and µ∗2 are strictly greater than zero.
If η∗ = 0 then either both µ∗1 and µ
∗
2 are zero or they are both strictly greater than 0.
Proof. When η∗ 6= 0. Now suppose both µ∗1 and µ∗2 are zero. Equations (3.22) and
(3.23) become:
1 = λ∗ + η∗
1
p∗0
1 = λ∗ − η∗ ps
p∗H
This implies that
η∗
1
p∗0
= −η∗ ps
p∗H
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η∗
0.5(1− p2s) + p2s
p∗0p
∗
H
= 0
η∗
0.5(1 + p2s)
p∗0p
∗
H
= 0
Which cannot be true for η∗ 6= 0.
When η∗ = 0, equations (3.22) and (3.23) become
µ∗1
p∗0 − 1
p∗0
+ µ∗2 = µ
∗
1 + µ
∗
2
p∗H − 0.5
p∗H
µ∗1(
p∗0 − 1− p∗0
p∗0
) = µ∗2(
p∗H − 0.5− p∗H
pH
∗
)
µ∗1(
1
p∗0
) = µ∗2(
0.5
p∗H
)
µ∗1(
1
ps
) = µ∗2(
1
1− p2s
)
We know that ps 6= 1. Thus, either both µ∗1 and µ∗2 are zero or they are both
strictly greater than 0.
Lemma B.2. a) Suppose η∗ 6= 0. If ps > 0.5, then µ∗1 > 0, µ∗2 = 0 and η∗ > 0. If
ps < 0.5, then µ
∗
1 = 0, µ
∗
2 > 0 and η
∗ < 0.
b) Suppose η∗ = 0. If ps 6= 0.5, then µ∗1 = µ∗2 = 0.
Proof. If ps > 0.5, then by definition of the cutoff value, when p = 0.5, the safe
project yields more than the risky project i.e. 0.5w∗H + 0.5w
∗
L < w
∗
0. This implies
that the right hand side of constraint (3.18) is strictly greater than the right hand
side of constraint (3.19). Thus, constraint (3.19) must hold with strict inequality and
µ∗2 = 0. Then by proposition B.1 µ
∗
1 > 0 if η
∗ 6= 0 and µ∗1 = 0 if η∗ = 0. Further, in
the case when η∗ 6= 0, from (3.22) and (3.23) we have that
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µ∗1
p∗0 − 1
p∗0
+ η∗
1
p∗0
= µ∗1 − η∗
ps
p∗H
p∗0 − 1− p∗0
p∗0
µ∗1 = −η∗(
ps
p∗H
+
1
p∗0
)
−1
p∗0
µ∗1 = −η∗(
p2s + 0.5(1− p2s)
p∗Hp
∗
O
)
1
p∗0
µ∗1 = η
∗(
0.5(1 + p2s)
p∗Hp
∗
O
)
which can only be true if η∗ > 0.
Similar argument applies for ps < 0.5.
Lemma B.1 is similar to Lambert’s proposition 2 and lemma B.2 is similar to
Lambert’s proposition 3.
Next, I prove some technical lemmas about η∗, ps and pf . Equation (3.25) can be
rearranged and written as:
Σxj
∂pj
∂pˆ
|pˆ=ps = Σw∗j
∂pj
∂pˆ
|pˆ=ps + η∗(w∗H − w∗L)
From (3.20) we know that the first term on the right hand side is 0. Thus,
Σxj
∂pj
∂pˆ
|pˆ=ps = η∗(w∗H − w∗L) (B.1)
Further, as argued earlier w∗H > w
∗
L. Therefore, the sign of η
∗ must be equal to
the sign of Σxj
∂pj
∂pˆ
|pˆ=ps . From lemma B.2, if η∗ 6= 0, the derivative of the expected
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value of the project with respect to the project selection cutoff pˆ is strictly negative
if ps < 0.5 and strictly negative if ps > 0.5.
Lemma B.3. a) η∗ < 0 if and only if ps > pf .
b) η∗ > 0 if and only if ps < pf
c) η∗ = 0 if and only if ps = pf
Proof. a) Consider the function Σxjpj = pˆx0 + 0.5(1− pˆ2)xH + (1− pˆ)2xL. The first
and second derivatives of this function are given by
Σxj
∂pj
∂pˆ
= x0 − (pˆxH + (1− pˆ)xL), Σxj ∂
2pj
∂pˆ2
= xL − xH < 0
Thus the function is strictly concave. Further, we know that Σxj
∂pj
∂pˆ
|pˆ=pf =
0 since the expected payoff from learning p is maximized at pf . Thus, for
any pˆ = ps
Σxj
∂pj
∂pˆ
|pˆ=pf > Σxj
∂pj
∂pˆ
|pˆ=ps ⇐⇒ ps > pf
From (B.1)
0 > η(w∗H − w∗L) ⇐⇒ ps > pf
As argued earlier, w∗H > w
∗
L. Thus, sign of η is equal to the sign of pf − ps
b) and c) Same argument as for part a)
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Now I prove the main result of this paper.
Proposition 3.2. a) If pf < 0.5 then ps ∈ [pf , 0.5].
b) If pf > 0.5 then ps ∈ [0.5, pf ].
b) If pf = 0.5 then ps = pf .
Proof. a) If pf < 0.5 then we have the following possibilities: (i) ps > 0.5, (ii) ps < pf
or (iii) ps ∈ [pf , 0.5]. If ps > 0.5 > pf , then pf − ps < 0 and by lemma B.3,
η∗ < 0. However, this contradiction lemma B.2. If instead, ps < pf < 0.5,
then by lemma (B.3), η∗ > 0. This again contradicts lemma B.2.Thus,
ps ∈ [pf , 0.5].
b) Similar argument as for part (a).
c) If pf = 0.5, then we have the following possibilities: (i) ps > 0.5, (ii)
ps < 0.5 or (iii) ps = 0.5. Suppose ps > 0.5 = pf , then by lemma B.3
η∗ < 0. But this contradicts lemma B.2. Similarly, suppose ps < 0.5 = pf ,
then by lemma B.3 η∗ > 0. But this contradicts lemma B.2.
In order to prove proposition 3.3 I rewrite the first order conditions (3.22)-(3.24)
as follows:
λ∗ = 1− ξ∗ ≥ 0 (B.2)
µ∗1 =
1
(1− ps)2 (−p
2
sµ
∗
2 + (1 + ps)
2ξ∗) ≥ 0 (B.3)
µ∗2 ≥ 0 (B.4)
η∗ =
1
(1− ps)(−psµ
∗
2 + (1− ps)ξ∗) (B.5)
ξ∗ ≥ 0 (B.6)
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Lemma B.4. Suppose ps 6= 0.5. Then η∗ 6= 0 if and only if ξ∗ > 0.
Proof. Suppose ξ∗ > 0 and η∗ = 0. Using lemma B.2, µ∗1 = µ
∗
2 = 0 and thus from
(B.3) we have that ξ∗ = 0, which is a contradiction. Suppose η∗ 6= 0, then either
µ∗1 > 0, µ
∗
2 = 0 or µ
∗
1 = 0, µ
∗
2 > 0. Once again, using (B.3), it must be that ξ
∗ > 0.
The above lemma along with lemma B.2 gives the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose ps 6= 0.5. ps 6= pf if and only if the multiplier on the
limited liability constraint is strictly positive.
Proof. Lemma B.2 and B.4 imply the result.
Corollary 3.1 If V
θ
> piI
(EUIX−xL) and pf 6= 0.5, then the optimal contract is not linear.
Proof. To see this, notice that if the optimal linear contract was optimal in general
then ps = pf . Using proposition 3.3 ps = pf implies that ξ
∗ = 0. Using (B.2), we then
have that λ∗ > 0 and the participation constraint must bind with equality, which is
untrue.
B.2 Concavity of objective function
consider the objective function (3.16) of formulation 1. Let Si = xi − wi be the
surplus that accrues to the principal when the output is xi. The Hessian matrix of
the objective function is:
H =

−SH + SL −1 p (1− p)
−1 0 0 0
p 0 0 0
(1− p) 0 0 0

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The Hessian is not negative semidefinite. Thus, the objective function is not
concave.
Next, I check if it is quasiconcave. In order to do so, I calculate the bordered
Hessian matrices which are given below:
D1 =
 0 S0 − (pSH + (1− p)SL)
S0 − (pSH + (1− p)SL) −SH + SL

D2 =

0 S0 − (pSH + (1− p)SL) −p
S0 − (pSH + (1− p)SL) −SH + SL −1
−p −1 0

D3 =

0 S0 − (pSH + (1− p)SL) −p − 12 (1− pˆ2)
S0 − (pSH + (1− p)SL) −SH + SL −1 p
−p −1 0 0
− 12 (1− pˆ2) p 0 0

D4 =

0 S0 − (pSH + (1− p)SL) −p − 12 (1− pˆ2) − 12 (1− pˆ)2
S0 − (pSH + (1− p)SL) −SH + SL −1 p (1− p)
−p −1 0 0 0
− 12 (1− pˆ2) p 0 0 0
− 12 (1− pˆ)2 (1− p) 0 0 0

|D1| < 0, but |D2| ≯ 0. So, the objective function is not even quasiconcave.
